Marys Medicine

Social Movements and Social Policy:
The Bolivian Renta Dignidad
Political Science Department, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Sara Niedzwiecki* Political Science Department, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque (856) 725-3672 * We would like to thank Evelyne Huber, John Stephens, and Camila Arza for comments on previous versions of this paper. Social Movements and Social Policy:
The Bolivian Renta Dignidad
The  impact  of  "old"  social  movements,  particularly  of  organized  labor  in  alliance  with  left   parties,  on  social  policy  has  been  well  theorized  and  documented.  The  influence  of  "new"  social   movements is still under debate, however. This paper studies the effect of old and new social movements, and their relationships to parties, on universal social policies through Bolivia's  old- age pension reform, the Renta Dignidad. Bolivia can be seen as a political laboratory for the study of social-movement outcomes, as movements have become the dominant form of political engagement in the country in the aftermath of neoliberalism. Bolivia was also one of the first Latin American countries to implement a universal old-age pension scheme. We contend that social movements have been critical for shaping this outcome. We find that new and old social movements in alliance with a left movement party in power were influential in the enactment of the Renta Dignidad. To what extent and under what conditions do "old" and  "new"  social movements shape the development of social policy? This article explores this question by analyzing Bolivia's universal pension scheme, Renta Dignidad. Our goal is to contribute to the debate on the impact that social movements have on the formation of social policy. We begin  by  making  a  distinction  between  "old"  and  "new"  social  movements,  even  if   there are continuities between the two (Foweraker 1995: 13-15, 43-45). Whereas the former are typically associated with organized labor and class-based mobilization, the latter are associated with a broader array of movements—including, among others, ecology, feminist, ethnic, and indigenous  peoples'  movements—and with multiple forms of collective mobilization (Álvarez and Escobar 1992: 3). We also engage with a branch of the social movement literature that examines the impact of social movements on policy outcomes (for a review, see Amenta et al. 2010). These analyses point out that social movements pursue social change by engaging in a wide array of activities that try to influence the policy-making process, such as engaging in generalized protests (Meyer and Tarrow 1998), exerting diffuse pressures (Amenta et al. 1992) introducing  issues  on  the  government's  agenda,  or  merely exerting veto powers (Andrews 2001, Jenkins and Klandermans 1995: 172-73).1 This article aims to redress these perspectives, which we believe are insufficiently nuanced, and to provide new insights on the formation of social policy by tracing the concrete agency of social movements. The implications are noteworthy; 1 For  example,  Andrews  (2001)  develops  the  "action-reaction  model,"  which  goes  as  far  as   arguing that movement mobilization has almost no direct influence beyond the initial point of setting the legislative agenda. Other scholars, however, have found that movements play an important role during the implementation of policy (McVeigh et. al 2003). they  can  help  us  gain  a  better  understanding  of  the  impact  of  "old"  and  "new"  social  movements   and their relationship with left parties in the formation of social policy. The literature on the formation of social policy in advanced capitalist democracies emphasizes  the  impact  of  "old"  social  movements,  particularly  organized  labor,  and  of  women's   mobilizations as key groups generating pressure for the expansion of social policy, particularly in collaboration with parties of the left (Huber and Stephens 2001).2 In Latin America, the formation of social policy has traditionally been seen in the literature either as a series of responses to the pressure exercised by politically influential organized groups (Mesa-Lago 1978), or as an executive-driven process characterized by the logics of concentration of power in the hands of powerful presidents (Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Weyland 2004). While the first approach  overemphasizes  the  impact  of  "old"  movements  leaving out non-traditional groups, the second approach stresses top-down processes rather than the organization and autonomous mobilization of pressure groups as a central contributing factor explaining the evolution of social policy. In addition, previous works on pension reform mostly focus on the determinants of state retrenchment. In so doing, they either downplay the relevance of social movements (Madrid 2003), indirectly incorporate the role of social movements by analyzing partisanship for explaining the characteristics that these reforms took in the different countries (Brooks 2009), or incorporate  pensioners'  organizations  as  veto  players  for  retrenchment  (Hernandez  2003).  More   recent analyses incorporate the expansion of pension schemes, and indirectly include social movements as a relevant variable. Huber and Stephens (2012) show how democracy produces egalitarian social policy by strengthening left parties and autonomous civil society. Following 2 The influence of organized labor is strongest where unions are allied with left parties, but organized labor can also push Christian Democratic parties in a more progressive direction. this debate, Pribble (2013) indirectly incorporates the effect of social movements in the process of reform of non-contributory pensions, by focusing on party character, which includes external linkages with base organizations. Building on these bodies of literature, we construct a set of theoretical expectations and explore their capacity for explaining the role of social movements in the development of social protection in contemporary Bolivia. While social policy reforms in Bolivia have been the subject of some attention in the literature,3 very little attention has been paid to the extent to which "old"   and  "new"  social movements have contributed to advancing such reforms. We argue that social movements have played a decisive role in achieving the universal pension scheme by exercising direct agency rather than being subjects of co-optation from above or simple electoral bases of support. We further argue that what mattered were their high levels of coordination and mobilization, which enabled them to play a crucial role in helping the MAS (Movement Towards Socialism) pass legislation in an adverse context. While our analysis privileges agency over structural determinants, it also confirms the importance of left political parties as crucial allies of social movements in explaining social policy formation (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001, 2012). We explore these issues through the analysis of Renta Dignidad. This policy represents the efforts conducted by the MAS to create a redistributive state that would guarantee the welfare of indigenous and peasant communities whose living conditions were precarious. It is a non- contributory universal pension scheme that is paid to all Bolivian citizens over the age of sixty, which has gained the status of an acquired right, and has proven highly successful in the benefits 3 See, for instance, Wanderley (2009); Gray Molina (2010); Stefanoni (2012: 58-61). it has brought to low-income families as well as in explaining the electoral success of the MAS (Crabtree 2011: 137-8). Bolivia is a substantively important case (Goertz and Mahoney 2012) because it is a country  currently  governed  by  a  "movement  party"  (on  these  parties,  see  Kitschelt 2006). The literature  on  the  Latin  American  "left  turns"  tends  to  group together Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador in  the  "radical"  or  "contestatory"  strand  of  the  left (Castañeda 2006; Weyland et al. 2010). In a more precise classification of left governments, Levitsky and Roberts (2011) classify the MAS as an example of the "movement left," for it is a new organization whose internal structures disperse power among grassroots actors and is more likely to be held accountable by those.4 In such a context, it is likely to expect a stronger impact of social movements than in countries with more strongly consolidated parties, such as in Chile and Uruguay. In systems with more consolidated parties, even  if  their  internal  structures  disperse  power  (like  Chile's  Socialist   Party  or  Uruguay's  Frente  Amplio),  these parties tend to play the leading role counting on support from social movements. Although Bolivia represents a best case scenario for our question, in so far as one would be most likely to find influence from social movements in a country governed by a movement party, three theoretical questions remain to be answered: (1) Did the positions of different kinds of social movements coincide or were there conflicts and problems of coordination? (2) Was 4 Whereas  the  MAS's  core  constituency  is  based  on  Bolivia's  rural  sector  and  consists  of the "cocaleros"  in  the  Chapare,  as  well  as  three national-level peasant organizations (the so-called trillizas, including CSUTCB, CSCIB, and CNMCIO-BS), its noncore constituency consists of a broader  set  of  urban  popular  organizations  and  voters  in  Bolivia's  largest  cities,  where   neighborhood associations and informal  workers'  organizations  play  a  key  articulatory  role. social movement influence diffuse, limited to agenda setting, or was it specific and extending to passage and implementation of the legislation? (3) What role did the specific characteristics of the policy design play in attracting movement support? The fact that, in contemporary Bolivia, movements have also proven to be successful in forcing the Morales government to reverse policies that affected well-organized groups, demonstrates that answers to the question about the impact of social movements on policies are not obvious.5 To examine the influence of social movements on Renta Dignidad, we employ process tracing and content analysis of newspaper coverage. Our analysis traces a very specific agency, policy-oriented and not diffuse, of vibrant social movements in Bolivia. Specifically, we find that new social movements as diverse as neighborhood associations, landless movements, peasant and indigenous movements, informal workers associations, pensioners, miners working for cooperatives, and other urban and rural local organizations allied to the MAS, were decisive actors in the enactment of Renta Dignidad in three stages of the policy process. We also find that the  policy  process  was  contentious  and  characterized  by  intense  conflict  among  "old"  and  "new"   social movements. Old and new movements initially reacted differently to the enactment of Renta  Dignidad.  The  Bolivian  Workers'  Central  (COB), for instance, initially opposed the policy on the grounds that it was unfair to those who had contributed to the pension system. Other traditional  organizations  representing  "insiders,"  such  as  factory  workers,  teachers,  and   journalists, did support the proposal from the beginning. Policy-oriented agency was successful during the design of the policy, in so far as the pressure exercised by neighborhood associations organized under the Municipal Federation 5 Although these other cases are beyond the scope of this paper, we have analyzed them elsewhere (Author cite). Association (FAM) resulted in a monetary compensation to its constituents. It also manifested itself during the process of legislative approval, when forces in the opposition had a majority in the senate, and social movements initiated a series of demonstrations to impress on representatives their support of the bill, counterbalancing the pressure from the opposition. Social movements also assured that the law would be passed by not letting opposition senators inside the building, that is, in ways that severely impeded the functioning of representative institutions. Finally, after the legislative bill of the Renta Dignidad was passed, social movements allied to the MAS reacted to the mobilization of opposition groups in order to ensure the implementation of the policy. This paper is divided into four sections. In the first section we review the literature on social movement outcomes. In the second section we discuss our data collection and research methods. The third section provides a contextual analysis of the political process of polarization and stalemate  that  defined  Bolivian  politics  during  Morales'  first  term  in  office. In addition, this section focuses on the process through which Renta Dignidad was implemented. We conclude by discussing how our case informs a new understanding of the conditions under which social movements matter: when new and old social movements are well organized and have strong linkages to parties, and when their interests align. 1. Conceptualizing Social Movements and Outcomes

We conceive of social movements as  "actors  and  organizations  seeking  to  alter  power  deficits  
and to effect social transformations through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political  action"  (Amenta  et  al. 2010: 288). Introducing  the  distinction  between  "old"  and  "new"   social movements helps us to emphasize the diversity of collective actors that struggle for social change, even if we admit that the boundaries between the two are not always clear-cut. Whereas old movements are typically associated with organized labor and are inclined towards material concerns, new movements are often associated with post-material issues and are less inclined toward material values (Foweraker 1995: 42). Rather than focusing on individual organizations, we pay attention to the larger "organizational field" in which they are embedded (Diani 2012), which enables us to stress problems of interorganizational coordination among old and new movements. Organizations mobilizing on behalf of a specific constituency for the defense of a particularistic benefit may not be willing to engage in wide interorganizational collaboration, at least not to the same extent as organizations mobilizing for broad public causes and policies.6 Because our focus is on the influence of movements on social policies, we concentrate on movements that directly or indirectly make claims on the state. Our definition excludes policy- oriented organizations and networks of professionals that, even though they place demands on the state, are more focused on changes internal to a group and its members than on broad policies. It also excludes groups that seek state intervention to impose their vision of morality, such as the anti-gay rights or pro-life movements. Social movement scholars agree that social movements have some impact on political outcomes and social change (Burstein 1999; Gamson 1990). They also agree that their political consequences have not been studied systematically enough (Andrews 2001). Over the past decade, however, there has been a wave of empirical research that looks at the impact of social movements on state-oriented outcomes (Amenta et al. 2010; Giugni 1998). On the one hand, a significant proportion of this scholarship has examined the influence of movements over public policies that provide collective benefits  to  movements'  constituencies. Where some have 6 In  fact,  one  "old"  social  movement,  Bolivia's  main  labor  union  confederation,  was initially opposed to Renta Dignidad. examined the impact of social movements on specific welfare programs (Andrews 2001; Amenta et al. 1994), others have looked at their impact on various areas of legislation enacted during periods of contention (Giugni 2004; Tarrow 1998). The impact of social movements on political outcomes is shaped by mobilizational resources (Rucht 1999), by structural constraints and opportunity structures (McAdam 1999; Kurzman 1996), by the process of framing (Snow and Benford 1992; Amstrong and Bernstein 2008), or by the strategic choice of movement leaders and protest types (Ganz 2009; Taylor et al. 2009; Walker, Martin and McCarthy 2008). Despite the richness of their findings in terms of the determinants of political outcomes, these studies focus disproportionately on industrialized and affluent societies. Theoretical reflection on Latin American social movements increased markedly during the 1980s and 1990s. In this region, social movements have blossomed in the context of the "third  wave"  of  democratization  and  the  implementation  of  neoliberal  economic  reforms. For the most part, however, studies during this period of political openings focused on the effects of movements on cultural and attitudinal rather than political outcomes; they have thereby highlighted the role of social movements in developing new identities, their multiple strategies and tactics, and also their contributions to the democratization of social practices (Escobar and Alvarez 1992). While most of this research and theorizing was optimistic about the potential of social movements, a more recent wave of studies has effectively criticized several of these cherished claims, including the oft-celebrated and imagined notion of autonomy from the state. Indeed, social-movement theory during this period tended to ignore the relationships that actually exist between movements, parties, and the state (for an early critique of this literature, see Assies 1990). Roberts (1998) argues that most of the literature on Latin American social movements has tended to overlook that movements are in fact subject to patron-client relationships that exacerbate their coordination problems, problems that are particularly notorious in contexts of deep inequalities and informality. He suggests that to enhance their transformative capacities movements need to find mechanisms of "social  and  political  coordination"  that  allow  them  to   overcome collective action problems; and that the best agents to build horizontal linkages are political parties (70-72). Kurtz  (2004)  also  shares  Roberts'  pessimism  regarding  the   transformative and democratizing capacities of social movements. Kurtz focuses on how neoliberal economic reforms, more so than even military repression, explain the demobilization of peasant movements in Chile and Mexico. His study documents not only how rural organizations became disarticulated but also how they turned into an electoral bastion for the conservative right, particularly in Chile. Though this picture of an oddly passive and demobilized peasantry during the implementation of neoliberalism may be accurate for Chile (much less so for Mexico), it does not fit the trajectory of rural movements in Bolivia. These have become bastions of opposition to neoliberal policies. One  of  these,  the  "cocaleros," formed a political party, the MAS, which has been in office since 2006. Studies on Latin American movements have highlighted the tensions that emerge when movements engage in formal politics: a competitive relationship between parties and movements (Oxhorn 1995), the danger of demobilization and splintering of the movement after parties with close links to movements gain state power (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005), and threats to their autonomy and loss of key activists while operating within power structures (Bruhn 1997). While this research has advanced our knowledge on the relationships between parties and movements, we still know very little about the impact of movements on political outcomes, such as the politics of redistribution. This research gap has serious theoretical costs, for it means that we lack a clear understanding of the influence of movements on redistributive outcomes. Given that movements struggle for these outcomes, and given the evidence showing that they do indeed have an impact on political issues of their concern, we think that ignoring the influence of social movements in analyses of redistributive policies is problematic. The hope is that this study will help improve our understanding of the relationship between social movements, parties, and social policies. Making causal claims about the influence of movements on social policy is not an easy task, but the risks of ignoring that movements matter outweigh these difficulties. We agree with Amenta et al. (2010) that one of the best ways to proceed is by analyzing political processes in the development of legislation. To make a convincing claim of their influence we need to "demonstrate  that  the  challenger  changed  the  plans  and  agendas  of  political  leaders;;  the  content of the proposals devised by executives, legislators, or administrators; the votes of representatives key  to  the  passage  of  legislation;;  of  the  speed  or  nature  of  implementation"  (301). We suggest doing this through an intensive analysis of a reform process in Bolivia, a country that has recently passed legislation towards a universal pension scheme. To trace the impact of movements, we rely on primary documents, particularly by carrying out content analysis of the main newspapers in Bolivia during the years around the reforms, and on interviews with actors involved in the process.
2. Study Design: Content Analysis and Process Tracing

Renta Dignidad is an important case for examining the impact of social movements on social policies for two reasons. First, it is a universal non-contributory pension that has been regarded as the highest progress towards a rights-based strategy among Latin American old-age protection systems (Arza 2012). Therefore, the analysis of coordinated pressure from a variety of social movements becomes highly relevant. Second, it was enacted by the MAS, which is a new party and an example of one that gives greater weight to social movements. We should therefore expect a strong influence of social movements helping the MAS pass this legislation. Our research design allows us to identify the impact of social movements on policy dynamics in different stages, from the design of the policy to the final approval in the legislature. The conflict surrounding the enactment of Renta Dignidad was about the sources of financing rather than the design of the benefits. The commitment to enact universalistic social policies is in good part commitment to guarantee that such policies will be sustainably funded (Pribble 2013). Renta Dignidad is a right in part because of such sustainable financing. Therefore, the contention over the sources of financing shows the conflict over universalistic policies. Social movements mattered particularly for making the financing of Renta Dignidad possible, not so much for the specific characteristics that the policy took.7 7 However, it might also be possible that the MAS promoted this policy for its own political reasons, to weaken opposition department that benefit from the hydrocarbon transfers. Although we do not focus on how the policy came onto the agenda, we need to comment on the suspicion that the MAS decided to fund the policy through the hydrocarbon taxes to weaken opposition forces in departments that benefit from the hydrocarbon transfers. The percentage of the hydrocarbon tax destined to fund Renta Dignidad is significant, amounting to 30 percent. Nevertheless, interviews in the field did not show this as the main motivation. In an interview, Bolivia's  Minister  of  Economy  commented:  "it  [Renta  Dignidad]  was  an  idea  of  the  president to deal with the very adverse social situation we inherited from the previous governments, not to Following  Amenta  et  al.'s  (2010)  suggestion  on  analyzing  the  political  process  in  the   development of legislation, we employ a two-tiered research design. This includes (1) a systematic process tracing that shows the complex interaction between social movements, the MAS, and social policy reforms, and (2) a content analysis of a major newspaper in Bolivia that shows the instances of support and opposition displayed by different actors involved. For the first tier of our design, we rely on newspaper accounts as well as on secondary sources. These data sources provide data on key actors and their activities. We supplement these written records with interview data collected in La Paz, Bolivia, in 2008 and also between 2012 and 2013. For the second tier of our research design, we coded news articles from La Razón,  which  is  Bolivia's   main La Paz-based  newspaper,  containing  the  word  "Renta  Dignidad." This newspaper is a particularly adequate data source for many reasons. First, it is the main newspaper in Bolivia, with the broadest national coverage. Second, this newspaper has been quite critical of the MAS administration and it therefore provides a hard test of our argument: the risk is of under-reporting the mobilization events in support of Renta Dignidad. In La Razón, we focus on the period from September 28, 2007 to February 28, 2008—that is to say, we cover a period of two months before and three months after the law was enacted. For the content analysis, we count events of mobilizations and verbal expressions of support for or opposition to Renta Dignidad. In a context of high polarization and stalemate such as in Bolivia in that period, the positions of support or opposition were clear-cut, and there is little ambivalence. In addition, we also consider expressions of support for or opposition to other stick our hands into their [opposition governors] pockets. We, as a ministry, only designed the technical sustainability of the source of funding. And we defended it during politically adverse times"  (interview  with  Arce  Catacora).   government policies in addition to the outcome of interest. For instance, social movements organized public demonstrations in support of both Renta Dignidad and the Constituent Assembly. For these cases, we include an additional category that contemplates this overlap. In the case of verbal expressions, our unit of analysis is the organization that expressed support or opposition to the policy. In short, we count every time an organized movement expresses an opinion about Renta Dignidad. Here is an example of verbal support for Renta Dignidad:  "The President of the Unique Confederation of Rural Laborers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), Isaac Ávalos, commented  that  ‘if  necessary  they  would  defend  the  Renta  Dignidad  with  mobilizations  in   Bolivia's  main  square'"  (La  Razón  2007a).8 The following quote is an example of verbal opposition  to  this  policy:  "In  a  public statement, the National Committee for the Defense of Decentralized Hydrocarbon Resources declared itself in permanent alert and it created an inter- institutional  committee  to  ‘adopt  the  necessary  measures'.  This  organization is composed by prefects and the civic committees of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, Chuquisaca, and Cochabamba,  as  well  as  by  some  municipalities  and  public  universities"  (La  Razón  2007b).  As   these quotes show, the position of the different organizations is clearly stated. In the case of mobilizations, our unit of analysis is each day in which one or more social movements, either supporting or opposing the reform, resort to a strike, protest, lockout or other strategy as its means of expression in a given geographical space. This means that if a given mobilization takes place over eight days, for instance, then than protest is counted as "eight." And if many organizations participate at the same place in that particular mobilization, then it is still counted as eight. In addition, if two protests in different departments take place in a given day, those events will be counted as "two." Our aim with this strategy is to measure the strength 8 All  translations  are  author's  translations. of the mobilization. Our assumption is that the longer the mobilization and the more geographically spread-out, the more pressure it exercises toward its position. Nevertheless, if organized social movements from a given department join an ongoing mobilization, that event is not coded. That is, we only count it as "one" for that particular day. Finally, if expressions of verbal support or opposition take place during a mobilization, we only code the mobilization and not the verbal manifestation. We present examples of expressions of support or opposition in Table 1, and a full counting of such expressions, discriminating months and participating organizations, in Table 2. Table 3 presents a list of acronyms and organizations. [TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 3. Case Study: The Renta Dignidad

The National Context of Renta Dignidad In the national election of December 2005, Evo Morales, a coca farmer and union leader, obtained  53.7  percent  of  the  vote  and  became  elected  Bolivia's  first indigenous president. Although these results guaranteed his party, the MAS, a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, where it won 72 out of 130 seats, they were not enough to guarantee a majority in the Senate, where the MAS obtained 12 out of 27 seats.9 Morales and the MAS gained power by successfully articulating the heterogeneous demands of groups and individuals who had become disenchanted with neoliberalism and the established political class. This group became a powerful yet loosely organized electoral coalition, which included, inter alia, coca-producing farmers, laid-off miners, peasant groups with land claims, and indigenous groups with indigenous rights and cultural claims. The process of coalition building that led to the 2005 election occurred amidst an intense cycle of mass protests and crisis of partisan representation (Mainwaring, Bejarano and Leongomez 2006). This cycle reached a peak in October 2003, with the Gas War that forced President Sánchez de Lozada to resign; and it reached another peak in May-June 2005, leading this time to the resignation of President Carlos Mesa and the call for anticipated elections. While it would be inaccurate to say that Morales and the MAS were instigators of these contentious episodes (Lazar 2006), after the popular uprisings of October 2003 the MAS came out as the political force able to incorporate popular discontent into a coherent political project (Stefanoni and Do Alto 2006; Harten 2011b: 84). Once in power, Morales addressed the demands set forth during the above mass mobilizations: he nationalized oil and gas, proclaimed a New Agrarian Reform Law, and called for a Constituent Assembly through which popularly elected delegates would rewrite the country's  constitution. This was a highly contested process and it reflected the dispute between west and east departments:  the  MAS'  agenda  ignited  opposition  from  the  governors in the 9 Parties of the right won the additional seats, turning them into a majority in this legislative body. Social and Democratic Power (PODEMOS) gained 13 seats; the National Unity Front gained 1 seat; and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) gained 1 seat. affluent, predominantly white and mestizo, eastern departments dubbed the Media Luna, as they saw their interests being threatened by the indigenous-led government and the new constitution. Because these departments have the largest gas reserves and the most fertile lands in the country, local business and landed elites quickly reacted against Morales by articulating an active right- wing counter-movement that has henceforth opposed the constitution, demanded regional autonomy, and voiced its opposition to the central authority in La Paz (Eaton 2007). This political  process  of  polarization  and  stalemate  defined  Bolivian  politics  for  much  of  Morales'   first term in office. Party-Movement Relations Becoming a governing party has altered the internal dynamics of the MAS (Harten 2011a; author's  citation  109-113). This process involved the articulation of formal and informal alliances with a wide array of new and old social organizations, particularly in urban areas, that were not sponsoring organizations of the MAS. This, in turn, involved the negotiation of spaces of power for these organizations, as many exchanged loyalty for positions within the public administration (Zuazo 2008). As a result members of the organizations that formed the MAS began to perceive, not without reason, that a clique of new members had taken prominent roles within the government and the party. For Román Loayza, who was one of the founding members of  the  MAS  and  is  now  a  dissident,  "we  [indigenous  peasants]  saw  that  leaders  of  social   organizations that did not struggle like we did soon became spokespersons of the MAS and they tried to utilize the MAS for their own interests. We were upset as we  watched  this  happening"   (interview with Loayza 2008). Looking  at  the  composition  of  Morales'  first  cabinet  of  ministers,   one can see that, with some minor exceptions, he staffed key positions in the executive branch with individuals external to these founding organizations. Out of 16 ministries, for example, 25 percent of this cabinet was constituted by urban, corporative, and mining sectors (Zuazo 2008). Table 4 shows  the  social  sectors  in  Morales'  first  cabinet  of  ministers. [TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] As a governing party, moreover, the MAS has in some instances used the social organizations that brought Morales to power as shock troops in violent mobilizations against opposition institutions, adversaries from the Media Luna, and congress members who opposed adopting the new constitution at the end of 2008 (Gamarra 2008; Madrid 2011: 252). In other cases, however, social organizations allied with the MAS have mobilized against the government thus showing their autonomy  and  placing  limits  on  Morales'  authority (Do Alto 2007; author's   citation; Crabtree 2013). In October 2006, for example, unionized mineworkers and miners working in cooperatives clashed in Huanuni over the control of mining activities in the Posokoni hill. On this occasion, the presence of cooperativist miners in the cabinet did not impede this sector from expressing an autonomous position against government policies and from spurring on social conflict (Zegada et al. 2008: 142-154). The conflict led to the expulsion of Walter Villarroel, a leader of the National Federation of Mining Cooperatives, from the Ministry of Mining (El Deber 2006). Although the strike was crushed by the government and did not force policy change, it demonstrated that Morales could not fully control popular organizations from above, and that these are not always docile. Renta Dignidad was enacted in this context of high polarization and complex relations between the MAS and social movements. From Bonosol to Renta Dignidad Bolivia's  pension  scheme  had  moved  from  a  pay-as-you-go—defined benefit and publicly managed system—into a privately managed system with individual capitalization accounts in 1997 (Law 1,732). Since 1997, the system included two basic tiers that followed the Chilean prototype (Mesa-Lago and Muller 2004; von Gersdorff 1997). The second tier included a contributory, privately managed benefit based on individual savings; and the first tier consisted of Bonosol, which was proposed in the context of the privatization of pension funds in the mid- 1990s by president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. Bonosol, or Bono Solidario, was a non- contributory pension scheme for all Bolivians above 65 years old and covered around US$248 per year. It was originally funded by the dividends of state-owned shares of privatized enterprises and administered by private pension funds (AFPs). Nevertheless, the benefit was only implemented  for  a  particular  cohort,  following  the  argument  that  "the  capitalized [privatized] enterprises  had  been  ‘paid'  by  the  beneficiary  population  and  they  are  just  being  ‘repaid'"  (von   Gersdorff 1997: 11). The initial idea that underpinned the program was that it would be abolished once the last beneficiary died. After the defeat of the incumbent Sánchez de Lozada, Bonosol was only implemented from 1997 to 1998 and from 2002 to 2007. In addition, the program was in constant risk of being halted due to its financial dependence to the privatized enterprises and the failure to be funded through other tax revenue (Muller 2009: 166-167). The creation of the Renta Dignidad represents a significant improvement in terms of social rights and stable sources of funding. As  Arza  (2012:  8)  describes  it,  Renta  Dignidad  is  "the only nation-wide universal non-contributory pension in Latin America providing benefits to all as a matter of right, with no behavioral or contributory conditions, no recourse to a means-test, gender-neutral  and  independent  from  family  structure."  Compared to Bonosol, Renta Dignidad is conceived of as a right to all cohorts, with no termination date. It is a right of all elderly Bolivian citizens and it has increased the number of beneficiaries to about 700,000 people (Wanderley 2009: 82-83). In addition, Renta Dignidad increases the Bonosol amount by 25 percent, providing US$314 per year, independently of previous contributions. The program also offers reduced benefits; those who receive a long-term pension from the contributory pension system will only receive 75 percent of the regular benefit (Law 3,791, Article 3; Muller 2009: 167).10 Finally, it is linked to redistributing the gains from the extractive process, through a tax on gas. Renta Dignidad involves a redirection of revenues coming from the hydrocarbon sector through the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH). The policy is funded by 30 percent of all resources received from IDH by department governments (prefecturas), municipalities, the indigenous fund, and the national treasury. It is also funded with the profits from the privatized firms that are deposited in the Collective Capitalization Fund. Amending the source of funding for the Renta Dignidad was a highly contentious process, and it ignited opposition from groups in the departments where the majority of the gas is produced. These groups launched a campaign and organized mass demonstrations against this program. Despite this opposition, the Senate passed the law and created this pension scheme. Social movements allied to the MAS played a significant role in the passage of the legislation by counterbalancing the pressure from the opposition, as it will be analyzed in the next section. 10 According to official data in 2010, 641,093 Bolivians received the full benefit and an additional 124,842 received the reduced benefit. The Contentious Road to Renta Dignidad After intense negotiations in the opposition-controlled Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, President Evo Morales implemented Renta Dignidad in November 28, 2007 (Law 3,791). Social movements close to the MAS—including, among others, the elderly, coca-growing farmers, indigenous movements, informal sector workers, and neighborhood associations—have been essential allies to the government throughout the passing of the legislation of Renta Dignidad.11 By contrast, social movements allied to the wealthier departments of the Media Luna have presented open and strong opposition to the source of financing of this policy, namely the IDH. In the next paragraphs, we will present the position, strategies, and relative success of social movements that pushed forward or opposed Renta Dignidad from September 2007 to February 2008. The initial period (September-October 2007), when Morales announced Renta Dignidad and its financing scheme through the IDH, was characterized by low-tenor verbal confrontations. In the weeks surrounding the legislative debate on Renta Dignidad, social movements changed their strategies and openly took to the streets. The level of confrontation increased on both sides, expressing  positions  such  as  "whatever it takes"  and  "civil  war"  (interview Patana 2008). After 11 Our focus is neither on the process through which the issue enters the legislative agenda nor on the internal legislative deliberations (or on the position of individual legislators). We focus on the political dynamics outside the Parliament, the dynamics of social mobilization in the streets. Still, it is important to highlight that grassroots organizations such as the National Association of the Elderly (ANAMBO), which is a national-level organization that draws support from the elderly in rural and urban municipalities across the country, played an important role in bringing the issue of better retirement benefits to the legislative agenda and to incorporate the topic into the development plan of the MAS. the Senate passed the policy, the months between December 2007 and February 2008 were characterized by mobilizations and expressions of opposition from the wealthiest departments and their supporting movements. Movements allied to the MAS, in turn, reacted to those mobilizations. Figure 1 presents a summary of all verbal and mobilization events throughout the analyzed period, from September 2007 to February 2008. The main empirical finding is that expressions of verbal support and opposition were roughly balanced, but social movements allied to the MAS had greater mobilization capacity relative to the mobilization of opposition movements. We argue that this capacity was crucial for the passing of the legislation. [FIG. 1 ABOUT HERE] The first expressions of support for Renta Dignidad emerged more than a month before the legislation was finally approved. The first groups to present verbal support were the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), which is a national representative organization of the Bolivian indigenous movement; the Unique Confederation of Rural Laborers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), which is  Bolivia's  most  extensive  labor  organization  representing   campesino (peasant) workers; and the Bolivian Syndicalist Confederation of Colonizers (CSCB), which is the main organization of the Reconstituted Native Peoples of Bolivia, oddly known as "colonizers." Other, predominantly urban organizations that voiced their support for the policy include the Regional Labor Federation-El Alto (COR-El Alto), which is an organization that represents factory workers, teachers, journalists and street vendors; the Federation of Neighborhood Boards-El Alto (FEJUVE-El Alto), which brings together residents and neighborhood associations of El Alto; and informal sector workers from El Alto represented by the Federation of Guildsmen. An interview with Edgar Patana, the executive secretary of Regional Labor Federation-El Alto, reveals that this organization unconditionally defended the government during the negotiation of Renta Dignidad. "In  the  worst  times,"  he  told  one  of  the   authors,  "[we  supported]  the  government  with  our  lives"  (interview with Patana 2008). Interviews with leaders from other organizations reveal the same pattern (interviews with Huanca 2008, and Guzmán 2008). The first round of moderate support encountered opposition from those groups that had been contributing to the pension system and considered it unfair that those who had never contributed would receive a similar income upon retirement. Workers represented by Bolivia's   main union federation—the Central Union of Bolivian Workers (COB)—were amongst the most vociferous opponents of Renta Dignidad (interview with Montes 2013). Teachers and unionized mineworkers affiliated with the COB deemed the benefit a charity. The main challenge, however, was directed at the funding sources of the policy: the decision to fund the policy through the hydrocarbons tax. As a result, departmental governments, municipalities, and universities would see their transfers from that tax diminished. The municipalities demanded compensations through their umbrella organization, the Federation of Municipal Associations (FAM). The FAM succeeded in their demand: in exchange for their support of Renta Dignidad, the national government increased the level of transfers from the hydrocarbons by taking an additional amount from the departmental governments and universities, thereby compensating for the contribution of municipalities to fund the new policy. In this way, the municipal resources were not altered. Nevertheless, the municipalities in the wealthier departments of the Media Luna did not consent to sign up for the agreement between the FAM and the government. These departments presented the strongest and most articulated opposition to Renta Dignidad. Their main demand was to not use the resources from the IDH to fund the policy, as it affected their interests. The stakes were high: 30 percent of the hydrocarbon transfers to the departmental governments were to be diverged to Renta Dignidad. After numerous expressions of verbal support, mobilizations against this policy started around four weeks before the final passing of the bill. A small amount of retirees mobilized in the main square in La Paz in September 28 but were dispersed by the police. In the departmental government of Tarija, for example, fasting retired women (ayunadoras) also mobilized in opposition to the reform. After the Renta Dignidad bill passed in the lower chamber, the PODEMOS-controlled senate passed a revised bill in November 23. The revised bill proposed five alternative sources of funding for Renta Dignidad. In this way, the transfers from the hydrocarbon taxes that came from the departmental governments would remain untouched. Social movements allied to the MAS reacted in response to this bill, and gave their full support to the original bill by which the policy would be funded by the hydrocarbon tax. As a reaction to this bill and in open support for funding the Renta Dignidad through hydrocarbon taxes, these social movements started a series of public demonstrations.  We  argue  that  the  social  movements' support for Renta Dignidad counterbalanced the opposition pressure from the wealthier departments and achieved the passing of the bill on November 28. Solid support demonstrations started eight days before the bill was passed. Public demonstrations—both of support and opposition—were geographically concentrated in the city of La Paz, which hosts the seat of government. They were also prominent in Sucre,  which  is  Bolivia's  official  capital  city. The organizations that mobilized during these eight days in La Paz and El Alto included thousands of people. The main movements were COR-El Alto, FEJUVE-El Alto, the  Federation  of  Gremialistas,  "colonizers",   coca-growing peasants, and peasant unions under the umbrella of the CSUTCB. In Sucre, similar movements organized a public demonstration of more than four hundred people in support for Mass demonstrations of support also moved from other departments to La Paz. The first one started in Caracollo (near Oruro) and 3,500 participants made it all the way to the political capital of the country. This demonstration included peasants, "colonizers" and indigenous peoples, coca-growing peasants from Cochabamba and the Association of Workers without Pensions (Asociación de Trabajadores sin Jubilación). Once the mobilization arrived in La Paz, it incorporated allied sectors, including neighborhood organizations from El Alto, miners, the National Confederation of Retired People (Confederación Nacional de Jubilados y Rentistas de Bolivia) and the COR-El Alto. The day the bill was voted on, these allied movements made a cerco, or human fence, around the national congress. Participants of the protest surrounded the Senate preventing the entrance of members of the opposition. In the words of PODEMOS senator  Tito  Hoz  de  Vila,  "[the  movements]  told  us  that  if  we  decided  to  enter the building, it was to vote in favor of the law (Renta Dignidad), but if we did not vote in favor, they would not let us out. Even the policeman in charge of security told us he did not recommend that we enter, because  they  had  let  the  peasants  into  the  Parliament  from  the  back  door  and  the  main  entrance"   (La Razón, November 28, 2007). In this way, the law that approved Renta Dignidad was passed in the absence of the opposing majority and while social movements were keeping guard outside. Renta Dignidad was finally enacted by Morales in November 28, 2007. He announced this  policy  surrounded  by  "a  multitude"  that  included  peasants and indigenous peoples, the elderly, and citizens from La Paz (La Razón, November 29, 2007). In his public speech, Morales expressed his aspiration to constitutionalize both Renta Dignidad and Bono Juancito Pinto,12 and he thanked the social movements for their active role in the struggle for these policies. After the law was passed, the National Democratic Council (CONALDE), which was headed by governors in the opposition Departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, Cochabamba and Chuquisaca, initiated a series of strikes that encountered open opposition of groups that support the MAS. In their first protests after the passing of Renta Dignidad, CONALDE organized road blockades that shut down access to La Paz. This organization also held a hunger strike. The  Women's  Civic   Committee in Santa Cruz, receiving the support of three hundred people, also declared a hunger strike. These mobilizations lasted five days. Opposition groups in Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, and Santa Cruz followed the same strategy. Reacting against these mobilizations, social movements allied to the MAS organized protests in some of these localities—including La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz—in  support  of  the  government's  policies. After these mobilizations were suspended, the negotiations were carried out at the elite level, between the national government and the dissident governors. The basic contours of the policy remained unchanged, however.
4. Conclusion

By looking at Bolivia's Renta Dignidad, our analysis has yielded a new understanding of the conditions under which old and new social movements can have an impact on social policy— namely, when they are well organized and have strong linkages to parties, and a majority of them support a given policy. In this way, our analysis also confirmed the importance of parties for the 12 Bono Juancito Pinto is a cash transfer targeted to poor families with children in primary school conditioned upon school attendance. expansion of social policy, a finding that has been firmly established in the literature on advanced capitalist democracies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001). The analysis of Renta Dignidad has revealed some of the ways in which social movements assisted with the passing of this controversial bill. We have argued that the passing of the policy was possible thanks to the intervention of social movements in key moments throughout the reform process. First, social movements mattered in the design of the policy. After exercising verbal pressure, the Municipal Federation Association gained compensation for the decrease in hydrocarbon transfer. Conversely, opposition movements did not gain any concession, and particularly the funding sources remained unaltered. Second, social movements mattered when the passing of the legislation was in danger. That is, when the opposition outnumbered the incumbents in the senate, social movements strategically kept a vigil outside the building. In this case, they assured that the law was passed. Third, social movements mattered for the implementation of the policy. After the bill was enacted, opposition movements mobilized against the use of hydrocarbon transfers as a way to fund the policy. Social movements allied to the MAS reacted to such opposition and gave their unconditional support to the government and the bill. The structure of the MAS as a new party, and as an example of one with close ties to social movements, crucially contributed to the success of this bill. In the 2005 election, the MAS successfully articulated a coalition of groups that reacted against neoliberal policies. Once in power, the introduction of policies such as the nationalization of gas and oil resources, the agrarian reform and the Constituent Assembly augmented the opposition from the Media Luna departments. Bolivia passed Renta Dignidad in a context of high levels of polarization and stalemate,  which  characterized  Bolivian  politics  during  Morales'  first  term.  Therefore,  some  of   the most prominent protests appear as a reaction to strategies from the opposition. The movements with stronger, even if informal, linkages to the MAS were fierce supporters of this policy. This included both the social movements that founded the MAS—such as coca-producing farmers,  "relocated"  miners  and  peasant  groups—as well as those groups that became central for winning electoral majorities in the 2005 election. Among others, these groups included the FEJUVE-El Alto, COR-El Alto, and unionized mineworkers. It should also be noted that, even though the MAS has sought to use political resources to control these organizations, they have not been neutralized under the Morales government. Indeed, these organizations have shown a significant degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the government, mobilizing both for and against the government  and  placing  limits  on  Morales'  authority.  This  reveals  how  important  it  is  to  pay   attention to what happens at the level of the social movements in Bolivia. What does this case study teach us about the influence of social movements in social policy reform beyond Bolivia? In highly mobilized sectors, such as the organized unemployed (or piqueteros) in Argentina, the teachers unions in Mexico, and the Sanitarista movement in Brazil, social movements can be promoters of universal social policies.13 For this to be the case, strong linkages with the major political parties need to be present. This is the case of the Peronist party in Argentina and its linkages to the piqueteros. Garay (2010) argues that the expansion of non-contributory social policies in Argentina responded to mobilization led by this movement of unemployed and informal workers that developed ties to unions and community organizations. The context of the 2001 economic and political crisis in Argentina further contributed to the extensive effect that piqueteros had over social policy. In Brazil, the role of Sanitaristas on the 13 The Sanitaristas are more like an advocacy group, an originally organized group of health professionals that could penetrate the state structure before the transition to democracy in Brazil. expansion of the unified healthcare system has been well documented (Falleti 2010, author's   citation). The Sanitarista movement was crucial for understanding the expansion of healthcare, mainly through its close ties with  the  Worker's  Party  and  through  occupying decisive positions in government, both at the national and subnational levels. In the case of multiple highly mobilized sectors, as in contemporary Bolivia, social movements need to develop a high level of coordination and mobilization that allow them to transform their micro-level collective action into a cumulative process of macro-level change (Roberts 1998). In the Bolivian case, this was facilitated by the context of social conflict that brought the MAS to power. This context created the propitious conditions for social movements not only to come to power but also to promote the construction of a redistributive state. References
Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su. 2010. "The  Political   Consequences  of  Social  Movements."  Annual Review of Sociology 36 (June): 287–307. Amenta, Edwin, Bruce G. Carruthers, and Yvonne Zylan. 1992. "A  Hero  for  the  Aged?  The   Townsend Movement, the Political Mediation Model, and US Old-Age Policy, 1934-1950."  American Journal of Sociology 98 (2): 308–39. Amenta, Edwin, Kathleen Dunleavy, and Mary Bernstein. 1994. "Stolen  Thunder?  Huey  Long's   ‘Share  Our  Wealth,'  Political  Mediation,  and  the  Second  New  Deal."  American Sociological Review 59 (5) (October 1): 678–702. Andrews, Kenneth T. 2001. "Social  Movements  and  Policy  Implementation:  The  Mississippi   Civil  Rights  Movement  and  the  War  on  Poverty,  1965  to  1971."  American  Sociological  Review 66: 71–95. Arce Catacora, Luis. 2013. Bolivia's  Minister  of  Economy.  Author interview. La Paz, 3 May. Arza, Camila. 2012. "Towards  a  Rights-based Policy? The Expansions of Old-Age Pensions in Latin America?"  Paper presented at the Research Committee on Sociology of Poverty, Social Welfare and Social Policy (RC19), 2nd Forum of Sociology of the International Sociological Association, Buenos Aires, 1-4 August. Assies, Willem. 1990. "Of  Structured  Moves  and  Moving  Structures:  An  Overview  of   Theoretical Perspectives  on  Social  Movements."  In  Structures of Power, Movements of Resistance: An Introduction to the Theories of Urban Movements in Latin America, 9–98. Eds. Willem Assies, G. Burgwal and T. Salman. Amsterdam: CEDLA. Brooks, Sarah M. 2009. Social Protection and the Market in Latin America: The Transformation of Social Security Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bruhn, Kathleen. 1997. Taking on Goliath: the Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Burstein, Paul. 1999. "Social  Movements  and  Public  Policy."  In  How Social Movements Matter. Eds. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Castañeda, Jorge G. 2006. "Latin  America's  Left  Turn."  Foreign Affairs 85 (3): 28-43. Crabtree, John. 2011. "Electoral  Validation  for  Morales  and  the  MAS."  In  Evo Morales and the Movimiento Al Socialismo in Bolivia: The First Term in Context, 117–142. Ed. Adrian J. Pearce. London: Institute for the Study of the Americas. Crabtree, John. 2013. From the MNR to the MAS: Populism, Parties, the State, and Social Movements  in  Bolivia  since  1952."  In  Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia J. Arnson, 269–93. Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Diani, Mario. 2012. "Organizational  Fields  and  Social  Movement  Dynamics."  In  The Future of Social Movement Research, ed. Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Conny Roggeband and Bert Klandermans, 145–68. Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press. Do Alto, Hervé. 2007. "El MAS-IPSP Boliviano.' In Reinventando la nación en Bolivia: Movimientos Sociales, Estado y poscolonialidad. Karin Monasterios, Pablo Stefanoni, and Hervé Do Alto (eds.). La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores. Eaton, Kent. 2007. "Backlash  in  Bolivia:  Regional  Autonomy  as  a  Reaction  Against  Indigenous   Mobilization."  Politics & Society 35 (1) (March 1): 71–102. El Deber. 2006. "Cambian  al  ministro  de  minería,"  El Deber, 7 October, 2006. Santa Cruz, Escobar, Arturo, and Sonia E. Alvarez. 1992. "The  Making  of  Social  Movements  in  Latin   America  :  Identity,  Strategy  and  Democracy".  Boulder,   Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Falleti, Tulia. 2010. "Infiltrating  the  State:  The  Evolution  of  Health  Care  Reforms  in  Brazil,   1964-1988."  In  Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen A. Thelen. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Foweraker, Joe. 1995. Theorizing Social Movements. 1ST ed. Pluto Press. Gamarra, Eduardo. 2008. "Bolivia:  Evo Morales  and  Democracy,"  in  Constructing  Democratic   Governance in Latin America, 3rd Edition, 124-151. Eds. Domínguez, J.I. and M. Shifter. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Gamson, William A. 1990. The Strategy of Social Protest. 2nd ed. Belmont, CA: Wasdworth. Ganz, Marshall. 2009. Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the California Farm Worker Movement. Oxford  ;New York: Oxford University Press. Garay, Candelaria. 2010. "Including  Outsiders.  Social Policy  Expansion  in  Latin  America".  PhD   Dissertation: University of California, Berkeley Gersdorff, Hermann Von. 1997. "Pension  Reform  in  Bolivia:  Innovative  Solutions  to  Common   Problems."  World Bank (July). Giugni, Marco. 1998. "Was  It  Worth  the  Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements."  Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1): 371–393. Giugni, Marco. 2004.Social Protest and Policy Change: Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective. Rowman & Littlefield. Goertz, Gary and Mahoney, James. 2012. A Tale of Two Cultures. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gray Molina, George. 2010. The challenge of progressive change under Eco Morales. In Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and shortcomings, 57-76. Eds. Kurt G. Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guzmán, Orlando. 2008. Advisor, National Coalition for Change (CONALCAM). Author interview. La Paz, 26 August. Harten, Sven. 2011a. The Rise of Evo Morales and the MAS. Zed Books. Harten, Sven. 2011b."Towards  a  ‘Traditional  Party'?  Internal  Organisation  and  Change  in  the   MAS  in  Bolivia."  In  Evo  Morales  and  the  Movimiento  Al  Socialismo  in  Bolivia:  The  First Term in Context, 93-116. Ed. A. J. Pearce. London: Institute for the Study of the Americas Huanca, Luis. 2008. Executive, FEJUVE-El Alto. Author interview. El Alto, 13 August. Hernandez, Diego. 2003. "Political  Process  and  the  Outcome  of  Structural  Reforms  in  Pension   Systems"  M.A  Thesis,  Department  of  Political  Science, UNC at Chapel Hill. Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2001. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2012. Democracy and the Left. Chicago: University of Jenkins, J. Craig, and Bert Klandermans. 1995. The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kaufman, Robert, R., and Joan M. Nelson. 2004. ‘Introduction:  the  Political  Challenges  of  Social   Sector  Reform',  in  Robert  R.  Kaufman  and  Joan  M.  Nelson  (eds.), Crucial Needs, Weak incentives: Social Sector Reform, Democratization, and Globalization in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004). Kitschelt, Herbert. 1993. "Social  Movements,  Political  Parties,  and  Democratic  Theory."  The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 528 (1) (July 1): 13–29. Kitschelt, Herbert. 2006. "Movement  Parties."  In  Handbook of Party Politics, ed. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, 278–90. Sage Publishers. Kurtz, Marcus J. 2004. Free Market Democracy and the Chilean and Mexican Countryside. Cambridge University Press. Kurzman, Charles. 1996. "Structural  Opportunity  and  Perceived  Opportunity  in  Social- Movement  Theory:  The  Iranian  Revolution  of  1979."  American Sociological Review 61 (1) (February 1): 153–170. La Razón. October  16,  2007a.  "Sectores  sociales  apoyan  la  decisión  de  Evo". La Razón. October  30,  2007b.  "Las  regiones  opositoras  se  unen  para  defender  el  IDH.  Guerra  de   Lazar, Sian. 2006. 2006. "El  Alto,  Ciudad  Rebelde:  Organisational  Bases  for  Revolt."  Bulletin of Latin American Research 25 (2): 183–199. Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth M. Roberts. 2011."Introduction:  Latin  America's  ‘Left  Turn':  A   Framework  for  Analysis."  In  The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, ed. Steven Levitsky, and Kenneth M. Roberts, 1–28. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Loayza, Román. 2008. Founding member of the MAS, former national deputy, and delegate to the Constituent Assembly. Author interview. La Paz, 22 July. Madrid, Raúl. 2003. Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Madrid, Raúl. 2011. "Bolivia:  Origins  and  Policies  of  the  Movimiento  al  Socialismo"  in  The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, 239-259. Eds. Levitsky, S. and K. Roberts. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Mainwaring, Scott, Ana María Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez. 2006. The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. McVeigh, Rory, Michael R Welch, and Thoroddur Bjarnason. 2003. "Hate  Crime  Reporting as a Successful  Social  Movement  Outcome."  American Sociological Review 68: 843–867. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 1978. Social Security in Latin America: Pressure Groups, Stratification, and Inequality. Pittsburgh, PA.: University of Pittsburgh Press. Mesa-Lago, C. and K. Müller. 2004. "La política de las reformas de pensiones en América Latina." In K. Hujo, C. Mesa-Lago and M. Nitsch (comps.), ¿Públicos o privados? Los sistemas de pensiones en América Latina después de dos décadas, Caracas, Nueva Meyer, David S., and Sidney G Tarrow. 1998. "A  Movement  Society:  Contentious  Politics  for  a   New  Century."  In  The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century, 1–28. Eds. Dadid S, Meyer and Sidney G. Tarrow. Lahnham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Montes, Pedro. 2013. Executive  Secretary,  Bolivia's  Workers'  Central.  Author  interview.  La   Müller, Katharina. 2009. "Contested  Universalism:  From  Bonosol  to  Renta  Dignidad  in  Bolivia."   International Journal of Social Welfare 18 (2): 163–172. Oxhorn, Philip. 1995. Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile. Penn State Press. Petras, James F., and Henry Veltmeyer. 2005. Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador. London  ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. Patana, Edgar. 2008. Executive secretary, COR-El Alto. Author interview. El Alto, 21 August. Pribble, Jennifer. 2013. Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roberts, Kenneth M. 1998. Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru. Stanford University Press. Rucht, Dieter. 1999. "The  Impact  of  Environmental  Movements  in  Western  Societies."  In  How Social Movements Matter, 204–224. Eds. Macro Giugni, Dough McAdam, and Charles Tilly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Stefanoni, Pablo. 2012. "Posneoliberalismo  Cuesta  Arriba:  Los  Modelos  De  Venezuela,  Bolivia   y  Ecuador  En  Debate."  Nueva Sociedad 239 (mayo-junio): 51–64. Stefanoni, Pablo, and Hervé Do Alto. 2006. Evo Morales. De La Coca Al Palacio: Una Oportunidad Para La Izquierda Indígena. La Paz, Bolivia: Malatesta. Snow, David, and Rob D Benford. 1992. "Master  Frames  and  Cycles  of  Protest."  In  Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, 133–155. Eds. A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller. New Haven: Yale University Press. Tarrow, Sidney G. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press,. Taylor, Verta, Katrina Kimport, Nella Van Dyke, and Ellen Ann Andersen. 2009. "Culture  and   Mobilization: Tactical Repertoires, Same-Sex Weddings, and the Impact on Gay Activism."  American Sociological Review 74 (6) (December 1): 865–890. Walker, Edward T., Andrew W. Martin, and John D. McCarthy. 2008. "Confronting  the  State,   the Corporation, and the Academy: The Influence of Institutional Targets on Social Movement  Repertoires."  American Journal of Sociology 114 (1) (July 1): 35–76. Wanderley, Fernanda. 2009. Crecimiento, Empleo y Bienestar Social: ¿Por Qué Bolivia Es Tan Desigual? La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores. Weyland, Kurt. 2004. Learning from Foreign Models in Latin American Policy Reform. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Weyland, Kurt G., Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter. 2010. Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings. New York: Cambridge University Press. Zegada, Maria Teresa, Yuri F. Torrez, and Gloria Camara. 2008. Movimientos Sociales En Tiempos De Poder: Articulaciones y Campos De Conflicto En El Gobierno Del MAS (2006-2007). La Paz, Bolivia: Centro Cuarto Intermedio; Plural Editores. Zuazo, Moira. 2008. ¿Cómo Nació El MAS? La Ruralización De La Política En Bolivia: Entrevistas a 85 Parlamentarios Del Partido. La Paz, Bolivia: Fundación Ebert. Table 1. Examples of verbal and mobilization support and opposition to Renta Dignidad (coded from La Razón newspaper)
Type of Groups Participating

Selected quotations from newspapers
El presidente de la Fejuve de El Alto, Nazario Ramírez, señaló que acompañarán y La Razón, October 16, 2007. defenderán el proceso porque beneficia a los alteños que carecen de ingresos "Sectores  sociales  apoyan  la   económicos. "Será  un  paliativo  y  les  permitirá  vivir  su  vejez  con  dignidad". decisión  de  Evo". Isaac Ávalos, ejecutivo de la Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos La Razón, October 16, 2007. de  Bolivia  (CSUTCB),  manifestó  ayer  que  defenderán  este  proyecto,  "si  es  necesario  con   "Sectores  sociales  apoyan  la   movilizaciones en  la  plaza  Murillo". decisión  de  Evo". Emilio Tórrez, dirigente de los maestros jubilados, dijo que se sienten discriminados por La Razón, October 16, 2007. el  Gobierno  ya  que  "disminuir  la  renta significa una discriminación al trabajo que hemos "Sectores  sociales  apoyan  la   realizado  cuando  éramos  activos". decisión  de  Evo". Half-Moon Regions "La  Universidad  Autónoma  Gabriel  René  Moreno  (UAGRM)  y  los  municipios cruceños La Razón. October 30, 2007. optaron por apoyar a la Prefectura de Santa Cruz en la lucha para evitar el recorte de las "Las  regiones  opositoras  se   asignaciones  regionales  del  Impuesto  Directo  a  los  Hidrocarburos  (IDH)",  informó  ANF   unen para defender el IDH. desde Santa Cruz. Paralelamente, las autoridades regionales convocaron para mañana a Guerra  de  posiciones" la Cumbre Social Autonómica para asumir medidas. ´Rechazamos el recorte´ "Ha  empezado  la  batalla  decisiva,  la  última  que  estaba  esperando  el  pueblo,  para  poder   La Razón. November 22, COR, Fejuve, gremials, artesanos, colonizadores, hacerse  escuchar",  declaró  ayer  el  máximo  dirigente  de  la  COR-El Alto, Édgar Patana, 2007.  "El  gobierno  pone  en   cocaleros; CSUTCB, ponchos en medio de una marcha que bajó desde El Alto hasta la plaza Murillo para reclamar al rojos (thousands) Senado por la aprobación de la renta Dignidad, movilización que estuvo acompañada por gritos  que  amenazaban:  "¡Guerra  civil!  ¡Guerra  civil!". Peasants, colonizadores, Las organizaciones sociales que iniciaron una marcha desde Caracollo para exigir al La Razón. November 22, indígenas, Cocaleros Senado Nacional la aprobación de la renta Dignidad, se concentrarán el lunes y 2007.  "El  lunes  volverá   Cochabamba, Federación de protagonizarán un nuevo cerco al Congreso Nacional (…)  Se sumaron los cocaleros de intento de cerco al Jubilados Oruro, Asociación de Cochabamba. Hugo Maldonado, de la Federación de Jubilados de Oruro y miembro de la Congreso" Trabajadores sin Jubilación Confederación Nacional, informó que ese sector apoya la marcha. El paro cívico convocado para hoy por el Consejo Nacional Democrático (Conalde) será La Razón. November 28, movilizado y con bloqueo de carreteras y rutas de acceso a las ciudades. La huelga tiene 2007.  "Los  cívicos  cierran   el respaldo de Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, Cochabamba y Chuquisaca, regiones hoy las carreteras en opositoras a la administración del presidente Evo Morales Ayma. El paro convocado por los seis departamentos es en protesta por el recorte del Impuesto Directo a los Hidrocarburos (IDH) —que el Poder Ejecutivo pretende destinar al pago de la renta Dignidad—, en defensa de la democracia y en rechazo a la aprobación del nuevo texto constitucional del Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). Comité Civico Femenino in Una multitudinaria marcha de teas se desarrolló ayer en el centro de la ciudad de Santa La Razón. December 7, Cruz. La movilización, organizada por el Comité Cívico Femenino, concluyó en la plaza 2007.  "Prefectos de 24 de Septiembre, donde al menos 300 personas realizan una huelga de hambre en contra oposición aceptan la consulta de las medidas del gobierno del MAS. y piden completarla" Table 2. Number of verbal and mobilization events in support and opposition to Renta Dignidad from September 28, 2007 to
February 28, 2008

Month, number, and organizations involved
Setptember - 7 (CIDOB, CSUTCB, FEJUVE-El Alto, Artisans, FAM) Verbal Support
November - 1 (Peasants) Verbal support to Renta and
November - 1 (Movements allied to MAS) January - 1 (FAM) September - 6 (Teachers, Cooperative Miners, CEUB, Colonizers, School Associations, FAM, Half-moon Regions) Verbal non support
November - 1 (Beni Municipal Associations) January - 1 (Civic Committee in Beni and Tarija) Verbal non-support Renta and
February - 2 (Conalde) November - 9 (COR, Fejuve, Fejuve-El Alto, gremiales, artisans, colonizers, cocaleros, Mobilization support (Days)
CSUTCB, ponchos rojos, Pensioners Oruro, Organization of people without pension, miners, pensioners) Mobilization support Renta
December - 3 (CIDOB Santa Cruz, COB La Paz, Allied movements in Cochabamba) Dignidad and other (Days)
Mobilization Opposition (Days)
January - 4 (Conalde, Tarija Civic Committee, Pensioners) Mobilization opposition Renta
January - 2 (Conalde, Women's Civic Committee in Santa Cruz) Dignidad and Other (Days)
Table 3. List of Acronyms and Organizations
Education Council from the University of Bolivia Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia Democratic National Council Regional Labor Federation Bolivian Syndicalist Confederation of Colonizers Unique Confederation of Rural Laborers of Bolivia Federation of Municipal Associations Federation of Neighborhood Boards-El Alto Half Moon regions Includes the regions of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Pando y Beni Table 4. Social  Sectors  in  Morales'  First  Cabinet  of  Ministers


Social Sector Represented
Juan Ramon Quintana Ministry of the Presidency Intellectual (independent) David Choquehuanca Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intellectual (independent) Alfredo Octavio Rada Velez Ministry of Government Intellectual Movement without Fear Walker San Miguel Ministry of Defense Gabriel Loza Telleria Ministry of Planification Engineer (independent) Alberto Arce Catacora Ministry of Economy and Finances Economist (independent) Ministry of Production Peasant Workers of Tarija Ministry of Services, Public Works and Jerges Mercado Suarez Engineer (independent) Carlos Villegas Quiroga Ministry of Hydrocarbons Intellectual (independent) Magdalena Cajias Ministry of Education Intellectual (independent) Nila Heredia Miranda Ministry of Health and Sports Walter J. Delgadillo Terceros Ministry of Labor Susana Rivero Guzman Ministry of Rural Development Intellectual (independent) Ministry of Mining Wage-earner Miners Abel Mamani Marca Ministry of Water Celina Torrico Rojas Ministry of Justice Source: Los Tiempos, January 24, 2006. Figure 1. Number of verbal and mobilization events (in days) in support and opposition to Renta Dignidad (September 2007-
February 2008)

Renta Dignidad and other Source:  Author's  coding  based  on  La Razón newspaper


Quantum Model of Memory anen1, February 1, 2006 1 Department of Physical Sciences, High Energy Physics Division, PL 64, FIN-00014, University of Helsinki, Finland. Recent address: Puutarhurinkatu 10,10960, Hanko, Finland. Geometric and subjective memories . . . . . . . . p-Adic physics as physics of intentionality . . . . . . Spin glass model of memories . . . . . . . . .

About division of pharmaceuticals in course of blistering and it's permissibility

About division of pharmaceuticals in course of blistering and it´s EVALUATION ACCORDING TO THE ORDINANCE ON THE OPERATION OF PHARMACIES DR. RER. NAT. THOMAS WELLENHOFER AND RA VEITH RÖSSGER TRANSLATED BY SEBASTIAN BECK IfpiV Zwieselstr. 15, 83395 Freilassing Are divided pharmaceuticals in nursing homes replaceable? Is it necessary to proof drugs durability in case of division?