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Letter from the Secretariat I, Anmol Kaur Bagga, Secretary General of TCET-MUN 2015, along with the Secretariat feel immense pleasure to welcome you to the TCET-MUN 2015. We feel honored to host you during the 3 days of ardent debate. Now in its fifth year, TCET-MUN has grown leaps and bounds from its humble beginnings in 2010. From a conference that simulated two committees back then, we are proud to have six committees this year. The conference is a culmination of dedication and commitment of many people, who worked to make this conference memorable and a quality learning experience. Model United Nations is a great way of learning about the world. In this era of globalization, being globally aware is more important than ever. Whether you are an experienced MUNner or this is the first time you delegate in an intellectual simulation of this sort, we promise to provide you right mix of challenge and learning. Your life as delegates to the United Nations begins with the research that needs to be carried out before the actual conference starts. This Study Guide will hopefully help you get started with the same. Realizing that for some of you, it might be your first MUN endeavour, it is our duty to inform you that we shall be following the UN4MUN Rules of Procedure and expect a basic understanding about the same. Having said that, we are always open to any queries that you might have with regards to the procedure or mode of research, and can be contacted even before the conference via mail. The agendas of every committee are of paramount importance on a global platform. As you put your delegate mode on, this is the time where you can learn and develop. Representing the country allotted to you, you will have to discuss, deliver speeches, lobby, innovate and come up with solutions. At the same time, you also will have to keep in mind whether the solutions are feasible or not. Although this will not really be easy, we hope it will be worthwhile. We hope you have a great experience at the conference, and take loads of new learning back at the end of the 3 days and be more aware of the issues concerning the world. In case you have any queries, the Secretariat would be more than happy to help. Have a great time! Anmol Kaur Bagga Secretary-General TCET Model United Nations 2015
Agenda I - Methods to combat illicit trafficking of counterfeit goods and transnational organized crime Table of Contents
1. What does "Transnational Organized Crime" mean? The United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) does not contain a precise definition of 'transnational organized crime'. Nor does it list the kinds of crimes that might constitute it. This lack of definition was intended to allow for a broader applicability of the Organized Crime Convention to new types of crime that emerge constantly as global, regional and local conditions change over time. The Convention does contain a definition of 'organized criminal group'. In Article 2(a): a group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for a period of time; acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least four years' incarceration; in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. Since most 'groups' of any sort contain three or more people working in concert and most exist for a period of time, the true defining characteristics of organized crime groups under the Convention are their profit-driven nature and the seriousness of the offences they The UNTOC covers only crimes that are 'transnational', a term cast broadly. The term covers not only offences committed in more than one State, but also those that take place in one State but are planned or controlled in another. Also included are crimes in one State committed by groups that operate in more than one State, and crimes committed in one State that has substantial effects in another State. The implied definition 'transnational organized crime' then encompasses virtually all profit- motivated serious criminal activities with international implications, like trafficking of illicit goods, humans, . This broad definition takes account of the global complexity of the issue and allows cooperation on the widest possible range of common concerns.
2. Scope of Transnational Organized Crime Organized crime has diversified, gone global and reached macro-economic proportions: illicit goods are sourced from one continent, trafficked across another, and marketed in a third. Mafias are today truly a transnational problem: a threat to security, especially in poor and conflict-ridden countries. Crime is fuelling corruption, infiltrating business and politics, and hindering development. And it is undermining governance by empowering those who operate outside the law: drug cartels are spreading violence in Central America, the Caribbean and West collusion between insurgents and criminal groups (in Central Africa, the Sahel and South-East Asia) fuels terrorism and plunders natural resources; smuggling of migrants and modern slavery have spread in Eastern Europe as much as South-East Asia and Latin America; in so many urban centers' authorities have lost control to organized gangs; cybercrime threatens vital infrastructure and state security, steals identities and pirates from the world's poorest countries (the Horn of Africa) hold to ransom ships from the richest nations; counterfeit goods undermine licit trade and endanger lives; money-laundering in rogue jurisdictions and uncontrolled economic sectors corrupts the banking sector, worldwide. Transnational organized crime encompasses virtually all serious profit-motivated criminal actions of an international nature where more than one country is involved. There are many activities that can be characterized as transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants, human trafficking, money-laundering, trafficking in firearms, counterfeit goods, wildlife and cultural property, and even some aspects of cybercrime. It threatens peace and human security, leads to human rights being violated and undermines the economic, social, cultural, political and civil development of societies around the world. The vast sums of money involved can compromise legitimate economies and have a direct impact on governance, such as through corruption and the "buying" of
elections. Every year, countless lives are lost as a result of organized crime. Drug-related health problems and violence, firearm deaths and the unscrupulous methods and motives of human traffickers and migrant smugglers are all part of this. Each year millions of victims are affected as a result of the activities of organized crime groups. 4. Major forms of Transnational Organized Crime Drug trafficking continues to be the most lucrative form of business for criminals, with an
estimated annual value of $320 billion. In 2009, UNODC placed the approximate annual worth of the global cocaine and opiate markets alone at $85 billion and $68 billion, respectively. Drug trafficking can also have a catastrophic effect on local violence levels. Drug "wars" can rival some conflicts in terms of body counts. Of the countries with the highest murder rates in the world today, many are primary drug source or transit countries. Human trafficking is a global crime in which men, women and children are used as products
for sexual or labor-based exploitation. While figures vary, an estimate from the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2005 indicated the number of victims of trafficking at any given time to be around 2.4 million, with annual profits of about $32 billion. Recent research on overall forced labor trends however would suggest that the scope of the problem is much bigger. In Europe, the trafficking of mostly women and children for sexual exploitation alone brings in $3 billion annually and involves 140,000 victims at any one time, with an annual flow of 70,000 victims. Smuggling of migrants is a well-organized business moving people around the globe
through criminal networks, groups and routes. Migrants can be offered a "smuggling package" by organized crime groups, and the treatment they get along the route corresponds to the price they pay to their smugglers. In the process of being smuggled, their rights are often breached and they can be robbed, raped, beaten, held for ransom or even
left to die in some cases, when the risks get too high for their smugglers. Many smugglers do not care if migrants drown in the sea, die of dehydration in a desert or suffocate in a container. Every year this trade is valued at billions of dollars. In 2009 some $6.6 billion was generated through the illegal smuggling of 3 million migrants from Latin America to North America, while the previous year 55,000 migrants were smuggled from Africa into Europe for a sum of $150 million. Illicit trading in firearms brings in around $170 million to $320 million annually and puts
handguns and assault rifles in the hands of criminals and gangs. It is difficult to count the victims of these illicit weapons, but in some regions (such as the Americas) there is a strong correlation between homicide rates and the percentage of homicides by firearms. Trafficking in natural resources includes the smuggling of raw materials such as diamonds
and rare metals (often from conflict zones). The trafficking of timber in South-East Asia generates annual revenues of $3.5 billion.11 In addition to funding criminal groups, this strand of criminal activity ultimately contributes to deforestation, climate change and rural The illegal trade in wildlife is another lucrative business for organized criminal groups, with
poachers targeting skins and body parts for export to foreign markets. Trafficking in elephant ivory, rhino horn and tiger parts from Africa and South-East Asia to Asia produces $75 million in criminal profits each year and threatens the existence of some species. Organized crime groups also deal in live and rare plants and animals threatening their very existence to meet demand from collectors or unwitting consumers. According to the WWF, traffickers illegally move over 100 million tons of fish, 1.5 million live birds and 440,000 tons of medicinal plants per year. The sale of fraudulent medicines is a worrying business, as it represents a potentially deadly
trade for consumers. Piggybacking on the rising legitimate trade in pharmaceuticals from Asia to other developing regions, criminals traffic fraudulent medicines from Asia, in particular to South-East Asia and Africa to the value of $1.6 billion. Instead of curing people, however, they can result in death or cause resistance to drugs used to treat deadly infectious diseases like malaria and tuberculosis. In addition to traditional trafficking methods, criminals continue to build a lucrative online trade in fraudulent medicines targeting developed and developing countries alike, which can also lead to health implications for consumers. Cybercrime encompasses several areas, but one of the most profitable for criminals is
identity theft, which generates around $1 billion each year. Criminals are increasingly exploiting the Internet to steal private data, access bank accounts and fraudulently attain payment card details. The profits of most crimes are generated as cash, which is risky for criminals. Difficult to hide, cash increases the probability of exposure, theft by rival criminals and seizure by the police. When cash enters the legitimate economy, it is particularly vulnerable to identification and law enforcement intervention. As a result, criminals move to prevent cash from attracting suspicion. For example, they may move it abroad, or they might use it to buy other assets or try to introduce it into the legitimate economy through businesses that have a high cash turnover. As an integral part of transnational organized crime, it is estimated that some 70 per cent of illicit profits are likely to have been laundered through the financial system. Yet less than 1 per cent of those laundered proceeds are intercepted and 5. Human Trafficking Human trafficking is a global problem and one of the world's most shameful crimes, affecting the lives of millions of people around the world and robbing them of their dignity. Traffickers deceive women, men and children from all corners of the world and force them into exploitative situations every day. While the best-known form of human trafficking is for the purpose of sexual exploitation, hundreds of thousands of victims are trafficked for the purposes of forced labor, domestic servitude, child begging or the removal of their organs. In 2005, ILO estimated that, globally, there are around 2.4 million victims of human trafficking at any given time. Trafficking for exploitation that is neither sexual nor forced labor is also increasing. Some of these forms, such as trafficking of children for armed combat, or for petty crime or forced begging, can be significant problems in some locations, although they are still relatively limited from a global point of view. There are considerable regional differences with regard to forms of exploitation. While trafficking for sexual exploitation is the main form detected in Europe and Central Asia; in East Asia and the Pacific, it is forced labor. In the Americas the two types are detected in near equal A. Child Trafficking Globally, children now comprise nearly one third of all detected trafficking victims. Out of every three child victims, two are girls and one is a boy. The global figure obscures significant regional differences. In some areas, child trafficking is the major trafficking related concern. In Africa and the Middle East, for example, children comprise a majority of the detected victims. In Europe and Central Asia, however, children are vastly outnumbered by adults B. Child Sex Tourism in East Asia When a person is too young to consent to sex, any sexual activity is inherently exploitative. In the region, the sexual exploitation of children appears to be especially prevalent in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam. Travelling child sex offenders make use of these markets, and also pursue children not involved in commercial sex. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has defined "child-sex tourism" as the sexual exploitation of children by men or women who usually travel from a richer country to engage in sexual acts with children in a less developed country.11 Child-sex tourism is committed by an individual or a network that facilitates the exploitation. Many males from Australia, the European Union and the United States, working as business travelers, development workers, teachers or long-term residents, have been identified as travelling child sex offenders in the Greater Mekong Subregion. According to UNICEF, however, the majority of sex tourists in East Asia are regional tourists. Due to the close links of commercial sex industries with child-sex tourism, cases involving East Asian travelling sex offenders - mainly from Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (Province of China) - have been detected in a number of Southeast Asian countries. In the Greater Mekong Subregion, travelling child-sex offenders make contact with local children through their accommodation or other tourist- related services. In addition, some resident foreigners have strong links to the community and it is one of the ways that travelling child-sex offenders groom children for abuse. Although relevant legislation has been adopted in countries of the region, including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam, these laws are often weakly enforced. 6. Drug trafficking Despite demonstrable counterdrug successes in recent years, particularly against the cocaine trade, illicit drugs remain a serious threat to health, safety, and security. The demand for illicit drugs, both in the United States and abroad, fuels the power, impunity, and violence of criminal organizations around the globe. Mexican DTOs are escalating their violence to consolidate their market share within the Western Hemisphere, protect their operations in Mexico, and expand their reach into the United States. In West Africa, Latin American cartels are exploiting local criminal organizations to move cocaine to Western Europe and the Middle East. There have also been instances of Afghan DTOs operating with those in West Africa to smuggle heroin to Europe and the United States. Many of the well- established organized criminal groups that had not been involved in drug trafficking— including those in Russia, China, Italy, and the Balkans—are now establishing ties to drug producers to develop their own distribution networks and markets. The expansion of drug trafficking is often accompanied by dramatic increases in local crime and corruption, as the United Nations has detected in regions such as West Africa and Central America. A. Drug Trafficking Routes Today, cocaine is typically transported from Colombia to Mexico or Central America by sea (usually by Colombians) and then onwards by land to the United States and Canada (usually by Mexicans). The US authorities estimate that close to 90% of the cocaine entering the country crosses the US/Mexico land border, and some 70% of the cocaine leaves Colombia via the Pacific, 20% via the Atlantic, and 10% via the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Caribbean. Following the dismantling of the Medellin and Cali cartels in the early 1990s, the Colombian organized crime groups got smaller and violence declined. At the same time, Mexican groups grew in size and strength, and today are responsible for most of the violence in Mexico. Most of the trafficking of cocaine to Europe is by sea. Most cocaine shipments to Europe are destined for one of two regional hubs: Spain and Portugal in the south and the Netherlands and Belgium in the north. Between 2004 and 2007, at least two distinct trans-shipment hubs emerged in West Africa: one centered on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, and one centered in the Bight of Benin which spans from Ghana to Nigeria. Around 90% of the global heroin supply comes from opium poppy cultivated in Afghanistan, and the majority of this is consumed in Europe, the Russian Federation and countries en route to these destinations. The route to the Russian Federation takes advantage of cross- border social and ethnic linkages in the new states of Central Asia, mostly moving the heroin in small amounts on board commercial and private vehicles. In contrast, the flow to Europe appears to be more organized, with much larger shipments crossing a greater number of borders involving states with much higher interdiction capacity. To get heroin to the Russian consumers, some 95 tons, or 25% of all Afghan heroin exports, must pass from Afghanistan into Central Asia, with Tajikistan handling most of this volume. The "Balkan route" proceeds by land from the Islamic Republic of Iran (or Pakistan into the Islamic Republic of Iran) via Turkey and through South-East Europe. To satisfy European demand for 87 tons of heroin, about 140 tons must depart Afghanistan along this route, largely due to high levels of seizures in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey. Most of this heroin is consumed in just four countries: the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Germany. 7. Environmental trafficking There are many forms of transnational organized environmental crime, and as global regulations grow, new forms will emerge. Classically, there are two major subheadings under which these offences fall. One is crime related to pollution, in particular hazardous waste dumping and the trade in ozone depleting substances. The second is crimes related to illicit harvesting of natural resources, in particular threatened animal species, timber, and In Africa, every state with a wildlife population is affected by poaching, but it appears that Central Africa is the main source of elephant ivory, and Southern Africa the main source of rhino horn. Some of these products are retailed to tourists locally, but very large consignments of ivory have been detected en route to Asia, representing larger organizations. There is evidence of militants being involved in the trade, including Somali and Sudanese groups. The transportation of wild animal parts, when detected, tends to raise questions. In contrast, the transport of large volumes of timber and wood products is a staple of international commerce. As with other ostensibly licit goods, the legality of any particular shipment of timber is based on paperwork. Fraudulent paperwork can be used for a number of purposes. It can transmute a protected hardwood into a more mundane variety. It can render a product originating in a protected area into one from an authorized source. In Asia, much of this paperwork is not forged – it is bought from corrupt officials in timber source countries. Imports of illicitly sourced wood-based products to the EU from China and South- East Asia in 2009 are estimated at some US$2.6 billion, and from South-East Asia to China at about US$870 million. Much of this commerce is based on fraudulently acquired paperwork sourced from corrupt officials in South- East Asia, and consequently it has become very difficult to disentangle licit and illicit in this area. "Cybercrime" has been used to describe a wide range of offences, including offences against computer data and systems (such as "hacking"), computer-related forgery and fraud (such as "phishing"), content offences (such as disseminating child pornography) and copyright offences (such as the dissemination of pirated content). Here, we've focused on two of the most problematic: the well-established fraud of identity theft and the previously unprofitable trade in child pornography. The former is an acquisitive crime, an updated version of check kiting. The latter is a kind of electronic trafficking, transmitting contraband across borders through the Internet. A. Identity Theft The misuse of credit card information is often identified as the most common form of identity- related crime, but most of this activity occurs offline. Electronic banking has offered opportunities for acquiring the cash more directly. Identity theft is not necessarily a crime that needs to be committed with the help of others. Both the seller and the buyer of identity-related information are involved in the offence, but they do not form a "group" any more than do the buyers or sellers of any other commodity. One of the great advantages of the Internet for criminals is that it allows the formation of exactly these ad-hoc associations between otherwise unrelated individuals. The USA has been reported as the leading source of credit card numbers advertised on underground economy servers. Figures from the USA show that most computer crime against US citizens is committed by other US citizens. Based on US data, the value of Internet-related identity crime globally can be estimated at some 1 billion dollars annually. B. Child Pornography Until recently, the production and acquisition of child pornography were highly risky activities. Only a limited number of pedophiles had access to the facilities to produce hard copy materials, most materials were produced by amateurs, and their dissemination was limited to social networks that were both difficult to establish and fragile. One of the risks associated with the growth of the Internet is that the greater accessibility of child pornography could lead to greater demand, and thus greater profitability in the production and sale of these materials. If child pornography were to approach the profitability of adult pornography, this could attract the attention of organized crime groups, transforming what had been a furtive paper exchange into a professional operation and leading to greater levels of victimization. The risk could be particularly acute in developing countries. To date, this threat does not appear to have been realized. 9. Counterfeit Goods The production and sale of counterfeit goods is a global, multibillion dollar problem and one that has serious economic and health ramifications for Governments, businesses and consumers. Counterfeiting is everywhere — it can affect what we eat, what we watch, what medicines we take and what we wear — and all too often the link between fake goods and transnational organized crime is overlooked in the search for knock-offs at bargain- basement prices. While the costs are difficult to quantify — and do not include non-monetary damage such as illness and death — the value of counterfeiting is estimated by the OECD to be in the region of $250 billion per year. The World Customs Organization noted that in 2008 counterfeit products destined for 140 countries were detected. In many countries the absence of deterrent legislation encourages counterfeiters, since they have less fear of being apprehended and prosecuted than they would for other crimes. Counterfeiters engage in elaborate plans to disguise their activities. They establish fictitious businesses and front companies. They exploit border-control weaknesses and poor regulatory frameworks. And they use false documents to obtain pharmaceutical ingredients, as well as manufacturing equipment to replicate genuine products. A. Countries of origin The number of counterfeits detected at the European border has increased dramatically in recent years, and most of these products originate in China (including Hong Kong, China and Taiwan, Province of China). In the financial year 2009, mainland China was the source of US$205 million worth of goods seized in the United States, which was 79% of the value of all counterfeit products seized that year. Hong Kong, China was the source of another US$26 million, or 10%, and Taiwan Province of China contributed another 1%. Collectively, then, some 90% of the value of the counterfeits seized in the US in 2009 came from China. The European Customs Union does not provide a similar valuation figure, but there is good reason to believe the problem is even more acute in Europe. The number of seizures in the US was less than one third of the number of cases registered at the European border, and the flow of counterfeits into the EU appears to be growing at a much faster rate. It appears that most of the counterfeits trafficked to the EU are shipped by sea. Containerized transport, often with a confusing series of way stations, is common for long distance traffic. Goods may also be ferried by speedboat to Hong Kong, China before being trafficked on from there. In addition, they may transit Xiamen, Quemoy or Matsu on their way to Taiwan, Province of China. Those destined for South-East Asia often make use of the land border crossing from Guangxi and Yunnan. Web based sales and courier delivery have become increasingly popular. As for many other forms of seemingly licit contraband, counterfeit goods from East Asia often transit free trade zones on their way to Europe, Dubai and other free trade areas in the United Arab Emirates. This allows the origin of the goods to be disguised, and it also allows unbranded products to be decorated with the appropriate logos close to the destination market. The United Arab Emirates is the second biggest source of counterfeit goods seized at the borders of the EU, the provenance of more than 15% of all cases recorded in 2008. Many of these goods may have been based on "raw" (unbranded) merchandise from East Asia. C. Counterfeit medicines One of the most harmful forms of counterfeit goods is fraudulent medicines. In recent years there has been a marked increase in the manufacturing, trade and consumption of these products — often with harmful results, and at times fatal. The sale of fraudulent medicines from Asia to South-East Asia and Africa alone amounts to some $1.6 billion per year — a sizeable amount of money being fed into the illicit economy. The World Health Organization estimates that up to 1 per cent of medicines available in the developed world are likely to be fraudulent. This figure rises to 10 per cent in various developing countries, and in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, fraudulent pharmaceuticals amount to as much as 30 per cent of the market. In an article in the medical journal The Lancet in mid-2012, it was noted that one third of malaria medicines used in East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are fraudulent. Meanwhile in Asia — a key manufacturer of legal medicine — the production of fraudulent drugs is seen to be on the rise. According to statistics from the World Customs Organization, around two thirds of counterfeits (medicines and other goods) detected globally in 2008 were shipped from East Asia. D. Global overview of counterfeit medicines A frequently cited estimate, attributed to the World Health Organization, is that 10% of the global medicine supply is counterfeit, rising to 30% in the developing world. Though the basis of this estimate is unclear, the figure is alarming, especially given the narrow definition of "counterfeit" used by the WHO. The bulk of world pharmaceutical sales occur in North America and Europe. These areas are not immune to counterfeit medicines: in 2008, the European Customs Union detected over 3,200 attempts to import bogus drugs, involving almost 9 million items, over half of which originated in India. Much of this trade involves so- called "lifestyle drugs" (particularly Pfizer's "Viagra"), however, often ordered from on-line pharmacies, although there have been a number of well publicized detections of counterfeit essential medicines destined for the legitimate supply chain in North America and Europe. Despite the relatively low value of drug sales in developing countries, pharmaceutical counterfeits are particularly prevalent in South-East Asia and Africa. According to the World Health Organization, counterfeits comprise less than 1% of the market value in most developed countries, although this figure may be increasing. In some developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the share is much higher, between 10% and 30%. As much as 50% to 60% of anti-infective medications tested in parts of Asia and Africa have been found to have active ingredients outside of acceptable limits. E. Countries of Origin While some of these drugs are produced locally, the bulk are said to be produced in Asia, in particular in India and China. According to the Commonwealth Business Council Working Group on Healthcare, "The vast majority of counterfeit medicines are currently thought to be produced in China, India and the Russian Federation, although significant numbers of illegal factories have also been reported in Nigeria, and the Philippines." According to Dora Akunyili, former Director General of the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) of Nigeria, "Most of the fake drugs in Nigeria come from India and China." There has been evidence from law enforcement; for example, large consignments of counterfeit drugs made in India and bound for Africa have been seized in Europe. Western Hemisphere: TOC networks—including transnational gangs—have expanded and
matured, threatening the security of citizens and the stability of governments throughout the region, with direct security implications for the United States. Central America is a key area of converging threats where illicit trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons—as well as other revenue streams— fuel increased instability. Transnational crime and its accompanying violence are threatening the prosperity of some Central American states and can cost up to eight percent of their gross domestic product, according to the World Bank. The Government of Mexico is waging an historic campaign against transnational criminal organizations, many of which are expanding beyond drug trafficking into human smuggling and trafficking, weapons smuggling, bulk cash smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom. TOC in Mexico makes the U.S. border more vulnerable because it creates and maintains illicit corridors for border crossings that can be employed by other secondary criminal or terrorist actors or organizations. Farther south, Colombia has achieved remarkable success in reducing cocaine production and countering illegal armed groups, such as the FARC, that engage in TOC. Yet, with the decline of these organizations, new groups are emerging such as criminal bands known in Spanish as Bandas Criminales, or Afghanistan/Southwest Asia: Nowhere is the convergence of transnational threats more
apparent than in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia. The Taliban and other drug-funded terrorist groups threaten the efforts of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the United States, and other international partners to build a peaceful and democratic future for that nation. The insurgency is seen in some areas of Afghanistan as criminally driven—as opposed to ideologically motivated—and in some areas, according to local Afghan officials and U.S. estimates, drug traffickers and the Taliban are becoming indistinguishable. In other instances, ideologically driven insurgent networks are either directly trafficking in narcotics or have linked up with DTOs to finance their criminal actions. The threatening crime-terror- insurgency nexus in this region is illustrated by cases such as that of INTERPOL fugitive Dawood Ibrahim, the reputed leader of South Asia's powerful "D Company." He is wanted in connection with the 1993 Mumbai bombing and is sanctioned under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (Taliban/al-Qa ida). Russia/Eurasia: Russian and Eurasian organized crime networks represent a significant
threat to economic growth and democratic institutions. Russian organized crime syndicates and criminally linked oligarchs may attempt to collude with state or state-allied actors to undermine competition in strategic markets such as gas, oil, aluminum, and precious metals. At the same time, TOC networks in the region are establishing new ties to global drug trafficking networks. Nuclear material trafficking is an especially prominent concern in the former Soviet Union. The Balkans: A traditional conduit for smuggling between east and west, the Balkans has
become an ideal environment for the cultivation and expansion of TOC. Weak institutions in Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have enabled Balkan-based TOC groups to seize control of key drug and human trafficking routes and Western European markets. The Balkans region has become a new entry point for Latin American cocaine, a source of synthetic drugs, and a transit region for heroin chemical precursors for use in the Caucasus and Afghanistan. Excess weapons are smuggled to countries of concern. Insufficient border controls and the ease of acquiring passports enable the transit of criminals and terrorist figures to Western Europe. West Africa: West Africa has become a major transit point for illegal drug shipments to
Europe and for Southwest Asian heroin to the United States. It has also become both a source of—and transit point for—methamphetamine destined for the Far East. West Africa also serves as a transit route for illicit proceeds flowing back to source countries. TOC exacerbates corruption and undermines the rule of law, democratic processes, and transparent business practices in several African states that already suffer from weak institutions. Due to its lack of law enforcement capabilities, its susceptibility to corruption, its porous borders, and its strategic location, Guinea-Bissau remains a significant hub of narcotics trafficking on the verge of developing into a narco-state. While many officials within the Government of Guinea-Bissau recognize the extent of the drug problem and express a willingness to address it, a crippling lack of resources and capacity remains a hindrance to real progress in combating drug trafficking. Asia/Pacific: TOC networks and DTOs are integrating their activities in the Asia/Pacific
region. Due to the region's global economic ties, these criminal activities have serious implications worldwide. The economic importance of the region also heightens the threat posed to intellectual property rights, as a large portion of intellectual property theft originates from China and Southeast Asia. Human trafficking and smuggling remain significant concerns in the Asia/Pacific region, as demonstrated by the case of convicted alien smuggler Cheng Chui Ping, who smuggled more than 1,000 aliens into the United States during the course of her criminal career, sometimes hundreds at a time. TOC networks in the region are also active in the illegal drug trade, trafficking precursor chemicals for use in illicit drug production. North Korean government entities have likely maintained ties with established crime networks, including those that produce counterfeit U.S. currency, threatening the global integrity of the U.S. dollar. It is unclear whether these USA: The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) is the largest piece of
anti-human trafficking legislation in U.S. history. Each year the United States Department of State issues a report on the situation of human trafficking in over one hundred and seventy nations worldwide. The yearly Trafficking in Persons report (TIP) is used by the U.S. primarily as a diplomatic instrument in order to create and encourage global partnerships and awareness. It has also launched various programs to combat drug trafficking, for example, "Plan Colombia", "Merida Initiative", etc. Russian Federation: The Russian Federation has been an origin, transit, and destination
country for women and children trafficked for sexual exploitation to and from numerous countries within the Gulf States, Europe, and North America. Russia has also increasingly become a transit and destination country for labor trafficking, both within the former Soviet Union and from neighboring countries. Since 1997, substantial efforts have been taken by both government agencies and organizations within civil society. Moreover, Russian government defends that human trafficking must not be seen only as a fight against organized crime and illegal migration, but, first and foremost, as a violation of human rights. Therefore, human trafficking responses must be directed from human rights and victim- centered approaches. Thailand: Thailand is a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and
children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Victims from neighboring countries, as well as China, Vietnam, Russia, Uzbekistan, India, and Fiji, migrate willingly to Thailand to seek employment, often with the assistance of relatives and community members or through the use of informal recruitment and smuggling networks. There are an estimated two to three million migrant workers in Thailand, most of whom are from Burma. The majority of the trafficking victims within Thailand— tens of thousands of victims, by conservative estimates—are migrants from Thailand's neighboring countries who are forced, coerced, or defrauded into labor or exploited in the sex trade. A significant portion of labor trafficking victims within Thailand are exploited in commercial fishing, fishing- related industries, low-end garment production, factories, and domestic work; some victims are forced to beg on the streets. African Union: The African Union understands that effective actions to prevent and combat
trafficking in persons require comprehensive regional and international approach involving origin, transit and destination countries. On the same day that six African countries (Chad, Eritrea, Niger, Mauritania, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe) were added to the US Tier 3 list (2009), the African Union launched a new initiative to combat human trafficking in the continent. The African Elephant Summit was held in Gaborone, Botswana where set of 14 urgent measures were adopted by consensus. European Union: The shutdown of the Italian patrol and rescue program known as Mare
Nostrum, led by the Italian Navy, the program saved thousands of migrants at sea. However, it was shut down due to budgetary constraints and replaced with Operation Triton, which is limited in scope to only collecting data about migrant smugglers. Many EU members are racing to build walls and fences to keep out illegal migrants fleeing from the conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Eritrea etc. Actions taken by the United Nations In 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted the Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons, urging Governments worldwide to take coordinated and consistent measures to defeat this scourge. The Plan calls for integrating the fight against human trafficking into the UN's broader programs in order to boost development and strengthen security worldwide. The United Nations Security Council has recently paid much attention to the threat posed by transnational organized crime. In the December 2009 Presidential Statement on Peace and Security in Africa, "The Security Council invite(d) the Secretary-General to consider mainstreaming the issue of drug trafficking as a factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions' assessment and planning and peacebuilding support". The Secretary-General, speaking at the African Union summit in January 2010, also emphasized the perils of illicit trafficking, particularly drugs. He noted that "Criminal networks are very skilled at taking advantage of institutional weaknesses on the ground." The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (also known as the ‘Palermo Convention') has attached to it the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air 2000, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime was adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 and is "the main instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime". It entered into force on 29 September 2003. States that ratify the instrument commit to taking a series of measures against transnational organized crime, including the creation of domestic criminal offences; the adoption of new and sweeping frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation; and the promotion of training and technical assistance for building or upgrading the necessary capacity of national authorities. Each year, transnational organized crime generates an estimated $870 billion, threatening peace and human security, leading to human rights being violated and undermining economic, social, cultural and political development of societies around the world. So serious is the organized crime threat that the UN Security Council has on several occasions considered its implications in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central America, Somalia, West Africa, and in relation to several themes (trafficking of arms, drugs, people, and natural resources). Around the world, organized crime has changed strategic doctrines and threat assessments. Armies have been mobilized to fight drug cartels, navies have been sent to capture pirates. Yet the threat persists. Without a global perspective, there cannot be evidence-based policy. Organized criminals generally do not seek to topple the state, but they can provoke a reaction that can also threaten long-term peace prospects. A clear sign that crime has become a national security threat comes when exceptional legal and security measures are taken, including calling on the military to help re-establish the government's authority. While sometimes necessary to reacquire lost territory, the long-term use of regular military forces to police civilian populations presents risks for the rule of law and civil liberties. Military and police officials may become frustrated with a corrupt or ineffective criminal justice system and begin to engage in extrajudicial executions. The public may form civilian vigilante groups as well. Over time, these paramilitary vigilantes can become as big a security challenge as the criminals they were formed to combat. If there is to be a new security consensus, it must start with the understanding that the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face, new and old, continue to be individual sovereign States, whose role and responsibilities, and right to be respected, are fully recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. But in the twenty-first century, more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone. Collective strategies, collective institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are indispensable. The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today's threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today's threats. And it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and not to harm its First, since crime has gone global, purely national responses are inadequate: they displace the problem from one country to another. Regional and international responses are enabled by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) adopted Second, states have to look beyond borders to protect their sovereignty. In the past, they have jealously guarded their territory. In the contemporary globalized world, this approach makes states more, rather than less vulnerable. If police stop at borders while criminals cross them freely, sovereignty is already breached – actually, it is surrendered to those who break the law. Therefore, trans-border intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation are essential. Third, since transnational organized crime is driven by market forces, countermeasures must disrupt those markets, and not just the criminal groups that exploit them. Otherwise, new criminals will simply fill the void, and new routes will be found. Fourth, since traffickers follow the paths of least resistance – characterized by corruption, instability and underdevelopment – it is essential to strengthen security and the rule of law. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the most effective antidote to crime, while crime prevention helps to reach the MDGs. Peacebuilding and peacekeeping make fragile regions less prone to the conflict that affects crime, while fighting crime neutralizes spoilers who profit from instability. Fifth, since criminals are motivated by profit, the key is to go after their money. That means strengthening integrity by implementing the United Nations Convention against Corruption. It also means stopping informal money transfers (hawala), offshore banking and the recycling through real estates that make it possible to launder money. In particular, governments and financial institutions should implement Article 52 of the anti-corruption Convention that requires Parties to know their customers, determine the beneficial owners of funds and prevent banking secrecy from protecting proceeds from crime. Sixth, since the wide-open window of trade is letting criminals in, it is essential to install filters. In the past two decades, insufficient regulation and unchecked growth, together with the Internet and free trade zones, have enabled abuse of the economic and financial systems. Today, greater vigilance is needed to keep illicit goods out of the supply chain; prevent the diversion of licit products into the black market; strengthen anti-corruption measures; profile suspicious container and air traffic; crack down on cybercrime; and exercise due diligence (for example, in banking and real estate). Questions A Resolution Must Answer 1. How can Member States improve tracking of illicit financial flows? 2. How can TOC groups be prevented from converting their illicit profits into licit 3. What can be done to prevent smuggling of persons? 4. How can victims of migrant smuggling be re-integrated back to their domicile countries? Is deportation an answer? 5. How can global interdiction capabilities be improved? 6. What can be done to decrease copyright infringement in PRC? 7. How can internet systems be secured against hackers? 8. How can human trafficking victims be protected from further abuse and being Agenda II – Combating narcoterrorism – the financial support to terrorist organizations Table of Contents 1. Definition
A. What do the terms "drug" and "narcotic drug" mean?
As stated by the UNODC: In medicine, it refers to any substance with the potential to prevent or cure disease or enhance physical or mental welfare; in pharmacology it means any chemical agent that alters the biochemical or physiological processes of tissues or organisms. In the context of international drug control, "drug" means any of the substances in Schedule I and II of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, whether natural or synthetic. In medicine, a "narcotic drug" is a chemical agent that induces stupor, coma, or insensibility to pain (also called narcotic analgesic). In the context of international drug control, "narcotic drug" means any drug defined as such under the 1961 Convention. B. What is meant by the term "terrorism"?
The UN Member States still have no agreed-upon definition of terrorism, and this fact has been a major obstacle to meaningful international countermeasures against terrorism. The UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (adopted on December 9, 1994), titled "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism," contains a provision describing terrorism: "Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them." UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) gives a definition: "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any C. So what does "Narcoterrorism" mean?
The UN Member States have no common definition of the word "narcoterrorism"; it was used first by former President Fernando Belaúnde Terry of Peru in 1983, to describe the terrorist-like attacks against the Peruvian police. Narcoterrorism, according to the US Drug Enforcement Agency, refers to the "participation of groups or associated individuals in taxing, providing security for, otherwise aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavors in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist activities". It is best understood as the organized employment of violence against the local populace, the security forces, and the government to intimidate anyone contemplating resistance to drug trafficking. While first recognized as a threat in Latin America, narcoterrorism has wreaked havoc across the world. From the FARC in Colombia, the PKK in Turkey, to al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the methods of narcoterrorism are employed by various terrorist organizations and drug cartels. As globalization has allowed for the interconnectivity of world markets it has also allowed for global trade in the illicit market. As a result, ties have been forged between various criminal groups in which drug trafficking is increasingly used to fund the operations of terrorist organizations and crime groups. Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and violent extremist organizations (VEOs), grasped this opportunity to develop cooperation and share competences at the international level, in order to promote and secure their agenda. The five major benefits of drug trafficking to terrorism may be listed as- 1. Funds for terrorism, 2. Chaos where drugs are present, sometime fostered by DTOs and VEOs to create a favorable environment for them, 3. Corruptions of public institutions with probably the intention to initiate support for terrorist organization, 4. Logistical support for DTOs and VEOs, 5. Challenges law enforcement and intelligence agency. It is estimated that almost a quarter of a billion people between the ages of 15 and 64 years used an illicit drug in 2013. The gross profits out of only cocaine sales (totaling US$85 billion) were estimated at US$84 billion for the year 2009, compared with about US$1 billion earned by the farmers in the Andean region. Most of the gross profits (retail and wholesale) were generated in North America (US$35 billion) and in West and Central Europe (US$26 billion). With drug use on the rise in many developed as well as developing economies, one can only make conjectures as to the total amount of money generated via sale of illicit drugs. The United States is the largest market for illegal drug consumption, resulting in violence and mayhem. To the Mexican drug cartels, this country by its drug consumption finances their drug empires. Once a less violent activity of Mexico's society, trafficking marijuana has in the last thirty years become a violent war resulting in the loss of thousands of innocent lives. Activities with the mass slaughter of women, children, and government officials have raised the violence to a level of terrorism. Because narcotics are the central reason for the fighting, and massive corruption, the label of narcoterrorism fits. Terrorist groups, criminal organizations, and states that sponsor terrorism are aware of this and are taking advantage of this problem. 3. Drug Producing Regions and Trafficking Routes The regions in which the cultivation and manufacture of drugs take place have not changed. Herbal cannabis production occurs in most countries worldwide, while the production of cannabis resin remains confined to a few countries in North Africa, the Middle East and South-West Asia. In South America, three Andean countries continue to account for virtually all global cultivation of coca bush, while the vast majority of illicit opium poppy cultivation worldwide remains concentrated in two countries in Asia. Cannabis continues to be the most-used drug worldwide. Coca bush cultivation continued to decline in 2013, reaching its lowest level since estimates from the mid-1980s. The decline in 2013 was driven mainly by an 18 per cent decrease in coca bush cultivation in Peru (from 60,400 ha in 2012 to 49,800 ha) and by a 9 per cent decrease in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (from 25,300 ha to 23,000 ha). Coca bush cultivation in Colombia, on the other hand, remained stable in 2013, although it remained at historically low levels. Available information for Colombia on the presence of coca bush cultivation shows that prior to eradication 89,215 ha were under cultivation at some point in South America remains the main departure hub for cocaine to the rest of the world. The cocaine-producing countries, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia and Peru, serve as departure (and transit) countries for the export of cocaine to the rest of the region. A number of other countries may serve as transit points for trafficking cocaine from Latin America to the major consumer markets in North America and Western and Central Europe, but Brazil (particularly since 2010) and Argentina are the cocaine transit countries most frequently mentioned in major individual drug seizures. The Netherlands, Morocco and Spain have been mentioned in individual drug seizures as the main departure or transit countries for cannabis over the past decade as a whole and continue to be so when considering more recent trends during the period 2010-2014. Albania and Argentina have emerged respectively as cannabis departure or transit countries in the past five years, confirming that cannabis cultivation and production are dynamic and widespread, and that trafficking routes may be in constant change. Heroin is produced in three different regions, but while there is information from reports of individual seizures on the trafficking routes for heroin from Afghanistan, available data does not currently allow for the identification of the transit countries used in the trafficking of heroin from Colombia and Mexico or from the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar. Pakistan is mentioned in individual drug seizure reports more frequently than other countries as a transit country for heroin seized elsewhere. This confirms that Afghan heroin is smuggled southwards from Afghanistan through Pakistan, but it may also suggest that this trafficking route is more successfully targeted by law enforcement in destination countries and/or that data reporting on the last departure country of the shipment seized is comparatively better for this route than for others. Although opium poppy is cultivated in South-East Asia, individual drug seizures indicate that neither of the opium cultivating countries in the region, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar, appears to be an important heroin trafficking departure hub. This may be due to the fact that Afghan heroin dominates the global market, but it may also reflect the fact that countries that report individual seizures are not markets for heroin produced in South-East Asia. Despite a temporary reduction from 2011 to 2013, the fact that heroin seizures in Afghanistan itself have increased in the past decade may show that an increasing amount of opiates are being intercepted before reaching markets outside Afghanistan. On the other hand, several countries reported increasing seizures of heroin trafficked via the southern route (on which heroin is trafficked to Asia and Europe often via African countries) as well as maritime routes, which is consistent with reports of an expansion of trafficking along the southern route. In Pakistan, opium seizures increased for the third consecutive year to reach 34 tons in 2013. The strengthening of controls between Afghanistan and Iran (Islamic Republic of) and between Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Turkey may have forced traffickers to move southwards towards the coasts of Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan. The increasing importance of Africa as a transit region for Afghan heroin bound for Europe and other regions has been reflected in increasing seizures of heroin being reported in recent years by some African countries, particularly in East Africa, and in seizures in Europe of African provenance. Since 2010, heroin seizures associated with the southern route have been reported in a number of European countries, including Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United 4. Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) Although violent non-state actors (VNSAs) have exerted a perceptible influence on the international system for centuries, it was only after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that they began to receive significant attention in the international community. Most of the groups examined in this study have been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S. Department of State. However, due to lack of a commonly accepted and comprehensive definition of the word "terrorism" (one State's "terrorists" are another's "freedom fighters", as it is colloquially said), there has been a lack of effective countermeasures to the rise of VNSAs. Some examples of VNSAs include – Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, the Hamas and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle East, al Shabab and Boko Haram in Africa, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, Shining Path in Peru. Through both the General Assembly as well as the more elite Security Council, the UN has attempted to use the powerful international means at its disposal to confront the threats posed by VNSAs; however, these attempts have consistently failed to restrain the destructive force of VNSAs. The Security Council, as the nonpareil body of states charged with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," passed Resolutions 1540 and 1673 in order to "prohibit states from assisting non-state actors in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction." However, the Resolutions, while ambitious, were wholly ineffective due to their complete lack of any international enforcement provisions. Similarly, the Terrorist Bombing and Terrorist Financing Conventions, passed by the General Assembly in the late 1990s as states began to comprehend the severity of the threats posed by VNSAs, both left enforcement of their provisions entirely up to the individual signatory states rather than the Security Council. This rendered the Conventions devoid of any meaningful effect because many of the states in which violent non-state actors operate are either unable to effectively project force into the peripheral areas in which terrorist groups tend to locate and operate or are otherwise complicit in the activities of the violent non-state actors within their territories. 5. Relationship between narcotics trade and VNSAs As a result of the significant decline in funding of guerrilla and terrorist groups by ideologically motivated state sponsors since the end of the Cold War, these groups have become increasingly reliant on drug trafficking as a funding source. Many terrorist and insurgents groups also in fact exploit a variety of illicit economies, including drugs. Depending on the locale and time period, other illegal or semi-legal commodities include conflict diamonds, special minerals, human beings, weapons, and illicit activities such as extortion, kidnapping, illegal logging, money laundering, and the illicit manufacture of passports. Such illicit economies exist in some form virtually everywhere, both within and outside the locales of military conflict. In most cases, the relationship between insurgent groups and drug-trafficking organizations or cartels is a mutually beneficial one that allows exchanges of drugs for weapons, use of the same smuggling routes, use of similar methods to conceal profits and fund-raising, e.g., informal transfer systems such as the hawala and the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE), use of the same resources for laundering money, use of the same corrupt government officials, and so forth. However, the cartels and the drug trafficking terrorist and extremist groups have different goals: the former are primarily motivated by financial enrichment and do not seek attention, whereas the latter, because of their political goals—or, in the case of the Islamic groups, both religious and political objectives—are more likely to receive close attention by the public and by law enforcement authorities. As a result, the insurgent groups and the drug cartels have a pragmatic, arm's-length relationship. Not only does it provide funds, it also furthers the strategic objectives of the terrorists. Some terrorist groups believe that they can weaken their enemies by flooding their societies with addictive drugs. 6. Case Studies A. Situation in Colombia The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (FARC–EP and FARC) is a guerrilla movement involved in the continuing Colombian armed conflict since 1964. FARC started their foray into the drug world by taxing local coca growers in southern towns. This tax was basically extortion disguised as a fee for providing security to the farmers from the Colombian government and paramilitaries. In order to push their leftist agenda, FARC was using the drug trade to fund the attacks against the Colombian government and even innocent civilians; "Their strategies and tactics involved many acts of terrorism in that they kill peasants suspected of colluding with the paramilitaries and they kidnap for ransom, preying on anyone suspected of possessing wealth beyond that prescribed by their communist dogma. They also use traditional military strategies and tactics and target the police and other symbols of government presence". Colombia launched an aggressive approach against FARC known as Plan Colombia that was supported by the United States. Billions of dollars were used by the U.S. government to strengthen and train the Colombian troops in an effort to eradicate coca crops and weaken guerrilla groups. However, they quickly found safe havens in neighboring countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador, from where they continued their cocaine operations used to fund their attacks against the Colombian government, albeit in a reduced capacity owing to the losses they sustained as a result of Plan Colombia. While Plan Colombia was successful in defeating much of the FARC, it struggled in many other areas. Much of the United States attention in Plan Colombia was focused on counter- insurgency, especially after 9/11, and preventing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. The economic development of Colombia has been held back by its reliance on the illegal drug trade. Many of the poor rural farmers have no other option but to grow coca and pay the tax enforced by FARC. New conflicts over land have increased once again and displacement of populations from land persists at very high levels. Homicides and kidnapping murders are up in Bogotá and Medellín, once hailed as a model success. The government's provision of security in many areas remains sporadic and spotty. The situation in Mexico clearly shows how narcoterrorism can destabilize a country. The symptoms were known, increasing drug production along and widespread abused of it, drug related crime, threats to public safety and health, corruption along with money laundering and the infiltration of the government and economy. The Sinalao Drug Cartel, one of the most powerful drug cartels in the world, has the logistic capabilities to smuggle anything into the US and is present in West Africa, Eastern and Western Europe, conducting its affairs with the Mara Salvaltrucha, commonly known as MS13, a transnational criminal organization. To recruit, they have a very advantageous welcoming package including well- paid jobs and health care while funding local government and political parties. Many hence believe that Mexico has become a narco-state. Additionally, there is proof today of al-Qaeda links with Latin America's VEOs but no evidence of ties with DTOs in Central and South America has been shown. B. IRA & Narcoterrorism FARC is not the only terrorist organization that has funded their attacks with the drug trade. The IRA terrorized Northern Ireland for decades with mortar attacks and car bombs. The IRA was founded in 1969 by Sinn Fein, as the legal political entity dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland. The IRA has engaged in assassinations and other forms of attacks in Northern Ireland and England since being founded. The IRA has justified the use of terrorist tactics to fight what they view as the unfair treatment of Catholics by Protestants in Northern Ireland. They have had several notable attacks that claimed many lives such as the Bloody Friday attack in which 22 bombs were used. The IRA has been notorious for their utilization of narcoterrorism to pursue their agenda in Ireland. While the IRA has been very vigilant in fighting the use of drugs within Ireland, it has not stopped them from selling drugs internationally to raise money for their terrorist aspirations. For example, in the 1980's IRA was caught smuggling over a ton of marijuana into the United States. The profits from the drug sale were to fund the purchase Shortly before 9/11 Colombian officials arrested three Irish citizens who were traveling in Colombia. It turned out that the citizens were explosive experts with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and had been training FARC on the creation and execution of mortar attacks. FARC paid upwards of $2 million for the training provided by the IRA. In 2002, the FARC would use this training to launch a mortar attack on the presidential inauguration of President Uribe. With the money acquired from FARC for the explosives training the IRA was able to pay for a shipment of 20 highly efficient Russian AN-94 assault rifles that Russian intelligence reported going to the IRA in 2001. Additionally, the IRA used narcotics acquired from the FARC to pay Croatian arm smugglers. As recently as March 2009, there have been terrorist attacks by a group affiliated with the IRA. The group known as the Real IRA killed two British soldiers and two civilians. The attack happened as peace talks had progressed between the IRA and Britain. U.S. Congressional testimony revealed some of the criminal and terrorism links of the Real IRA. The report provided evidence that the Real IRA is involved with the illicit drug sale in the Middle East. Additionally, the seizure of drugs flowing into and out of Northern Ireland has increased in C. PKK & Narcoterrorism Located in Turkey, but with members in Iraq and Iran, the PKK is the Kurdistan Worker's Party. Founded in the 1970's they are a militant organization that pursues the same leftist ideology that FARC has fought for in Colombia. Classified as a terrorist group by the United States, the PKK has long fought the Turkish government. Because the PKK have dealt extensively with criminal organizations in trafficking both arms and narcotics, they have been considered an important nexus of criminal activities with terrorism. In the 1990's the PKK moved to a more urban attack approach and over the course of the decade it claimed the lives of over 30,000 people. After their leader, Abdullah Ocalan was arrested, peace prospered for several years. However in recent years, there has been a spike in violence as the militant wing of PKK rose to power. Terrorist attacks have been made against tourist attractions and hotels in the area. Evidence indicates that a large amount of the funding used for these PKK attacks is raised through the illicit drug business. In fact, the PKK makes around $10 million a year from drug running and extortion. Reports indicate that since 1984 there has been a convergence between organized crime groups and the PKK. However, as the PKK realized the profitability of the drug business they used their ties in the region to sell drugs to finance their operations. This evolution of shifting from a simple tax of the drug producers and traffickers to producing and delivering the drugs themselves is very similar to what FARC did. Unlike many nations, such as the United States, Turkey has done a much better job at linking organized crime, the drug trade, and terrorist organizations together. Understanding the role of the drug trade in the financing of PKK and their terrorist attacks has been a key tenet of the Turkish counter-terrorism strategy. D. Situation in Afghanistan Two decades of war created much hardship for the people of Afghanistan. The country's infrastructure was destroyed, its human resource base depleted and its social capital eroded. The majority of the population was left extremely poor, lacking food, clothing, housing and medical care. State institutions were dysfunctional and the economy and society fragmented. A number of state institutions – central bank, treasury, tax collection system, customs, police, and judiciary – were either extremely weak, politically corrupted, or simply missing. Taxing opium income of farmers and traders was often the only reliable source of income for which ever authority prevailed. With an estimated poverty rate of 60% and a per capita income of only $300, poverty is the primary reason many farmers rely on the illicit economy for survival. For the estimated 2.9 million Afghani farmers involved in the drug trade, they receive less than 20% of the revenue. The landowners, warlords, traffickers, public officials, and terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban, receive the majority of the profit.55 In addition to receiving the lion's share of the revenue, these same criminals levy taxes as well as impose exploitative sharecropping and land tenure agreements upon the already impoverished poppy farmers. To continue to earn a living under these conditions, farmers are forced to borrow money from landholders using the expected crop yields as collateral. When the farmers are unable to repay the loans due to drought or a poor harvest, they become trapped in an endless cycle of debt and repayment. While the commercial production of opium continues to be the only means of survival for many Afghan farmers, the desire to realize the full potential of the market by traffickers has led to the exploitation of ungoverned and unprotected land suitable for harvesting poppy. As a result, the illicit drug trade is more confined in Afghanistan to those regions that are more remote and hostile, thus limiting counter-narcotics efforts due increased protection by terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban. To protect their illicit drug market from law enforcement, traffickers provide weapons, funding, and personnel to the Taliban in exchange for the protection of drug trade routes, poppy fields, and their organizations. From an economic standpoint, unless poppy farmers are afforded the opportunity to earn a living growing alternative crops, eradication simply puts more of a drain on the economy. The drug market provides the only access to land, credit, water, and employment for many farmers, especially those in remote and less governed regions of the country. Until additional investment is made in providing more security to lawless regions, alternative economic opportunities are simply unrealistic. Furthermore, eradication efforts have served to bolster legitimacy for terrorist organizations with the local populace due to their support of the opium farmers. Other negative consequences of the eradication approach have included increased attacks on law enforcement officials attempting to eliminate opium crops. Additionally, opium farmers who have become unemployed as a result of the destruction of their drug fields have been easily recruited by the terrorists. Without providing an alternative means to earn a living, the eradication policy also seriously damages the legitimacy of the government. So, while there has been some success with eradication and alternative development, ultimately the responsibility rests with Afghanistan's government and its ability to build a viable and cohesive central government. Furthermore, impoverished Afghanis must view the government as legitimate and feel economically and personally secure under the watchful eye of the administration. Until this occurs, narco-terrorists will continue to exploit Afghan farmers, and the lawlessness and violence will continue to plague the country. With the continued violence and lawlessness associated with the illicit drug trade threatening to destroy the country, it is clear Afghanistan's current policies and efforts in counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism are failing. Until Afghanistan establishes itself as a legitimate government with the capacity to enforce the rule of law, realizing any long-term success for the country will remain unrealistic. 7. Problems with current US policies It is widely recognized that access by VNSAs to the gains from drug production and trafficking contributes to the intensity and prolongation of military conflict. Also, that such groups—terrorists, insurgents, or warlords—grow stronger when they successfully exploit the drug trade. The United States' response—its antinarcotics policy—emphasizes crop eradication. This strategy is too simplistic and, ultimately, ineffective. The view prevailing in the U.S. government assumes that belligerents simply gain financial resources from their access to the illicit economy, which they can convert into greater military capabilities and use to expand the conflict. Consequently, the logic goes, if the government eradicates the illicit drug economy, the VNSAs will be significantly weakened if not altogether defeated. This narcoterrorism/narcoguerrilla thesis ignores not only the extreme difficulties in successfully eradicating the illicit drug economy in a particular country, but also the highly unpredictable effects of eradication on the profits of the belligerents. Crucially, it also ignores the important side-effect of strengthening the bond between these groups and the local population. Many terrorist and insurgents groups do in fact exploit a variety of illicit economies, including drugs. Depending on the locale and time period, other illegal or semi-legal commodities include conflict diamonds, special minerals, human beings, weapons, and illicit activities such as extortion, kidnapping, illegal logging, money laundering, and the illicit manufacture of passports. Such illicit economies exist in some form virtually everywhere, both within and outside the locales of military conflict. Territory-based organizations such as the Taliban can control and tax the cultivation and processing of illicit crops, for example. But it is extraordinarily hard for a loose network without a substantial territorial base—such as al Qaeda today—to profit from cultivation and processing. It is much more likely that groups like al Qaeda will attempt to control some part of the international smuggling routes or some aspect of money laundering. In fact, most of the tangential evidence publicly available regarding al Qaeda and drugs indicates that it could have penetrated the international traffic with drugs beyond the border of Afghanistan. If al Qaeda is in fact profiting from en route trafficking, then eradication is a distinctly ineffective solution. Even if all drugs in Afghanistan were eradicated, in the absence of a large-scale reduction of worldwide demand for opiates, opium poppy cultivation would simply shift into another territory—the so-called balloon effect. The likely candidates for picking up production slack from Afghanistan would be Myanmar, Pakistan, and the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. In all three cases, al Qaeda would probably be able to maintain control of a part of the international traffic, and if cultivation relocated into Pakistan and Central Asia, might well be able to tax some cultivation as well. Paradoxically, successful eradication in Afghanistan—a pipe dream, currently—might well enable al Qaeda to obtain far greater benefits from the 8. DTO – VEO – Population Relationship Financial benefits to belligerent groups are frequently in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Their profits grow as they move from simply taxing the producers (peasants) of the illicit substances, to providing protection and safe airstrips to the traffickers, to taxing precursor agents or the final illegal commodities, to controlling parts of international trafficking routes, to getting involved with money exchange and laundering. These profits are used to improve military capabilities by facilitating procurement, to increase the salaries paid to soldiers, and to improve logistics. The facilitation of procurement and logistics allows belligerent groups to optimize their tactics and strategies for achieving their larger goals. These groups no longer need to attack military arsenals for procurement and can concentrate on strategic, and visible targets. A successful sponsorship of the illicit economy thus speeds up the process by which terrorists and insurgents can transform themselves from a ragtag band of insurgents-in-hiding to a formidable belligerent actor. Most important, and neglected by the conventional wisdom on narcoterrorism: belligerents derive significant political gains, particularly political legitimacy, from their involvement with the drug economy. They do so by protecting the local population's reliable, lucrative, and frequently sole source of livelihood from the efforts of the government to repress the illicit economy. They also frequently protect peasants from brutal and unreliable traffickers, by bargaining with traffickers for better prices on behalf on the peasants, by providing otherwise absent social services such as clinics and infrastructure to the local population, and by claiming nationalist credit if a foreign power threatens the local illicit economy. This political legitimacy is frequently very thin, but nonetheless sufficient to motivate the local population to withhold intelligence on the belligerents from the government if the government attempts to suppress the illicit economy. Obtaining this local human intelligence is one of the key and irreplaceable ingredients for victory against terrorists and insurgents. These three components of gain also reveal the very uneasy alliance between narcotraffickers and belligerent groups. The belligerent groups provide the traffickers with protection from the government's repressive policies, with a safer transportation system, and make sure that drug producers (peasants) deliver the promised raw materials for the illicit commodities. In return, the drug dealers provide the belligerents with financial benefits and intelligence on the government's military movements. However, the relationship is inevitably complicated by the fact that the belligerents have multiple audiences and interests: they also protect the population from the traffickers and bargain for greater prices on behalf of the population, and they demand great financial payoffs from the traffickers and seek to displace the traffickers from aspects of the illicit economy. Far from having morphed into an identical actor with identical goals, the guerrillas and the traffickers frequently have many competing interests. Accordingly, government policies should be designed to split the tactical and rather fragile alliance between the two actors, bidding them against each other and allowing them to undermine each other. Getting access to drugs vastly increases the staying capacity of belligerents. Yet weaning terrorist groups and insurgents from the drug trade by eradication is extraordinarily difficult. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, eradication may not reduce the financial benefits of the belligerents; rather, it might just as well increase the international market price for the drug to such an extent that the final revenues for the belligerents may be even greater. In fact, it was the desire to boost farmgate prices for opium that motivated the Taliban to undertake extensive (even if temporary) eradication in 1999-2000. Moreover, the extent of the financial losses to the terrorists and insurgents also depends on the adaptability of the belligerents, traffickers, and peasants: their ability to store drugs, replant after eradication, increase number of plants per acre, shift production to areas that are not being eradication, use genetically-altered high-yield, high-resistance crops, or switch to other illicit economies. The FARC in Colombia, for example, makes only 50 percent of its income from drugs. The rest comes from extortion, kidnapping, and other activities. In Myanmar, after production of opiates shifted to Afghanistan, many warlords and insurgents changed to the production of synthetic drugs and easily maintained their income. There has not been one case in which eradication bankrupted the belligerent group to such a point that it eliminated it. The desired impact of eradication to decrease the financial resources of the belligerent group is far from certain and is likely to take place only under the most favorable circumstances. Eradication increases the political benefits to belligerent groups. Local populations are all the more likely to support such groups and to deprive governments of intelligence about them. Without viable alternative livelihoods for vulnerable populations, eradication loses hearts and minds and at the same time fails to significantly weaken belligerent groups. 9. Policy Solutions Effective policy must be implemented to deal with the emerging threat of narcoterrorism. There is not a single policy that will eliminate the threats posed by narcoterrorists. Rather it will take the implementation of several policies that seek to mitigate the influence and effect of narcoterrorism in various areas. These areas include properly defining the threat of narcoterrorism, tracking and freezing financial assets of transnational criminal organizations, handling the supply and demand problem with narcotics, and utilizing foreign aid. A. Defining Narcoterrorism Part of the difficulty in creating a policy that effectively mitigates narcoterrorism is that there are so many different definitions of the term. The definition of narcoterrorism can focus on the FARC's involvement in the drug industry or it can focus on their terrorist actions. Emma Bjornehed believes that there are two different definitions of narcoterrorism; "the definition of narcoterrorism is almost dual in character, where the emphasis is placed on the drug aspect or the terrorism aspect may vary considerably." As made evident by FARC and other terrorist organizations, the international drug trade has become the most common and profitable criminal activity. Part of this difficulty in defining narcoterrorism and attempting to identify narcoterrorists is the convergence of crime and terrorism. Tamara Makarenko states that the "1990s can be described as the decade in which the crime–terror nexus was consolidated: the rise of transnational organized crime and the changing nature of terrorism mean that two traditionally separate phenomena have begun to reveal many operational and organizational similarities." The following chart exhibits the growing similarity between crime and terrorism. According to Paul Wilkinson, the FARC is a perfect example of a group moving along the continuum; "it is clear that this has made them, both in reality and popular perception, little more than a branch of organized crime, decadent guerrillas rather than genuine revolutionaries, irredeemably corrupted by their intimate involvement with narcotraffickers and their cynical pursuits of huge profits from kidnapping and from their ‘protection' of coca and opium production, processing and shipping facilities." Policies to counter narcoterrorism must view crime and terrorism in the same light. Some nations (Britain, Turkey) are far ahead of other nations in viewing the relationship between crime and terrorism. The progressive nature of the UK's view on terrorism and crime is made evident by examining the measures they have taken to combat the emerging threat. The international community must work together closely to mitigate the effect of narcoterrorism. This can include sharing intelligence, providing military assistance, and legally cooperating. Effective narcoterrorism policy must manage to track and freeze the monetary assets of terrorist organizations and criminal groups. B. Financial Assets The financial profits to narcoterrorists are frequently in the hundreds of millions of dollars. As was the case with FARC, Vanda Felbab-Brown states that "their profits grow as they move from simply taxing the producers of the illicit substances, to providing protection and safe airstrips to the traffickers, to taxing precursor agents or the final illegal commodities, to controlling parts of international trafficking routes, to getting involved with money exchange and laundering. These profits are used to improve military capabilities by facilitating procurement, to increase the salaries paid to soldiers, and to improve logistics." With so much money changing hands, future policies must be created to track the financial resources of the narcoterrorists. To get at insurgent/terrorist financial resources, we should focus on combating international as well as source country money laundering, on interdicting the financial flows to the insurgents, and on beefing up international interdiction capabilities. Tracking money flow of narcoterrorist organizations should be an integral part of any policy. Jane Boulden writes that; "The key advantage of targeting financial resources is that it promises to be as global as terrorism. It is a striking coincidence that the aftermath of September 11 also seems to have dealt a temporary blow to the antiglobalization movement. On the one hand, terrorist operations are deemed to be nothing without terrorist financial organizations; on the other hand, state sponsors can be cast as terrorist banks as well as donors." Similar to every policy prescription for narcoterrorism, tracking financial resources of these terrorist organizations should be global in scope. Much of the money made by terrorist organizations and criminal groups is either laundered or used to corrupt officials. Similar to every policy prescription for narcoterrorism, tracking financial resources of these terrorist organizations should be global in scope. Much of the money made by terrorist organizations and criminal groups is either laundered or used to corrupt officials. C. Supply & Demand Another difficult issue facing the approach toward narcoterrorism is the view of producer nation vs. consumer nation. The United States is the largest drug consumer in the world but blames the supplying nations for its drug epidemic. Contrarily, the supplying nations blame the United States and claim that the country needs to do more to reduce the demand. Moses Naim claims that this is due to the fact that it is a natural reaction for a government to fight the supply of goods because it is much easier to protect its border than it is to convince its citizenry to stop a certain habit. If the United States is serious about curtailing its drug use and consequently funding narcoterrorism, a new policy approach must be implemented. It must be made clear to the public that the purchase of drugs is funding organized crime and terrorists around the world and the money could be used to fund an attack against the United States. Additionally, to curtail drug abuse in the United States an increased effort to prevent and intervene drug use will be necessary. An alternative policy option would be for the United States to offer a similar assistance package to other nations as it did in Plan Colombia. While Plan Colombia was successful in weakening FARC's presence in Colombia, it struggled in many other areas. FARC simply crossed the porous borders into nations like Ecuador and Venezuela that were not receiving the same support as Colombia. Future policies should account for this and provide aid and assistance to the entire region so that crossing the border is not such an attractive option to FARC. While Venezuela has held harsh views of the United States and much of the Western world, there were signs at the recent Summit of the Americas that they would be willing to work with President Obama. The threat of narcoterrorism is very serious and can be felt across every region of the world. Narcoterrorism poses a threat to more than just the nations in which these groups exist. The globalization of the economy has created a network for terrorist organizations and criminals to coordinate, cooperate, and share resources. Unfortunately, policy has been slow to catch up to the convergence of crime and terrorism. Moving forward it will be vital to the security of the international community for international governments to work together. This can be done by sharing intelligence, financial information, and developing a unified approach to breaking up the ties between crime and terrorism. All of the prescribed policy approaches have one common ingredient; they must be international in scope. If the international community is to work together to defeat transnational criminals and terrorists than international governments must coordinate government. The links forged by narcoterrorists and criminals are too vast for one nation to make a difference. By pulling resources together, the international community can uncover the links between crime and terrorism and consequently the effects and fund raising capabilities of narcoterrorists like FARC will be severely decreased. Major Countries Involved Bolivia: Bolivia is one of the leading producers of Coca paste and therefore, quite
obviously, has a massive role to play in the production of narcotics. However Bolivia possesses a neutral stance on this issue and does not want to address this problem. The president of Bolivia, Evo Morales expelled the DEA and the US ambassador saying that the government has been striving to eradicate this problem and will continue to do so, thus protecting his country's national sovereignty. However the US and Bolivia have restored diplomatic ties and the former has collaborated with Brazil to train soldiers on their fight against drugs. Brazil has tightened border controls. Conversely, there have been no policies to address the production of coca paste and the consumption of narcotics, both of which have meteorically risen in the past few decades. United States of America: The USA is the single largest market for cocaine produced
in the Andean region and therefore has a colossal responsibility as it deals with Mexican drug cartels and an unprecedented increase in the consumption of narcotics. The U.S. Federal Government is an opponent of the illegal drug trade; however, state laws vary greatly and in some cases contradict federal laws. This contradiction arises when non-medical cannabis is illegal according to federal laws, but is not criminalized (up to certain amounts) in states such as Alaska and Colorado. The USA also has several initiatives and programs, collaborating with countries such as Colombia and Mexico, as it provides military and economic aid. Russian Federation: Drug abuse is an extremely serious problem for Russia, which is
a big market for both Cocaine and Heroin. It is estimated that injecting drug users number 1.8 million and opiate users number 1.6 million. The numbers of injecting drug users have also resulted in a severe increase of HIV patients with 78% of the 1 million HIV affected people being injecting drug users. Russia's stand on solving this problem is driven mainly by criminalization and prevention. It opposes medically assisted therapies. Mexico: Drug cartels belonging to Mexico control most of the transport of narcotics
from the sites of their production to the North American market. Historically, presidents of Mexico have made initiatives to stop this illicit drug trade, with both Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderon sending forces to escalate their anti-drug campaigns. Mexico, a major drug producing and transit country, is the main foreign supplier of cannabis and a major supplier of methamphetamine to the United States. Almost half the cartels' revenue comes from cannabis. Afghanistan: Afghanistan is a major source country for the cultivation, processing,
and trafficking of opiates, producing 59 percent of the world's supply of illicit opium in 2002. It is the biggest producer of opium and Hashish amongst the nations present in the ‘Golden Crescent'. Since the invasion in 2001 and the lifting of the Taliban opium ban, opium production in Afghanistan has increased from 70 percent of the overall global illicit opium production to 92 percent today. This increase has occurred in along with the declining security situation precipitated by the 2001 coalition invasion of the country. The loose relationship between terrorist organizations, violence, decentralized governance, and poverty that existed prior to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in Afghanistan, has resulted in a truly narcoterrorism-driven Myanmar: Opium poppy cultivation and heroin refining take place in remote,
mountainous border regions of Burma. Armed ethnic groups such as, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kokang Chinese, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) control the cultivation areas, refine opium into heroin, and also produce methamphetamine. Nepal: Nepal's open border with India and its proximity to Pakistan and Burma make
it an attractive alternate transit route for illicit narcotics from the Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle regions to Europe, other points in Asia and the US, as well as escape routes for drug traffickers. Narcotics trafficking have become prevalent due to the close proximity of the Indo-Nepalese borders aligning with the state of Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir in India, which are the principal opium producing states. Drug money moves easily over the border with India or through Nepal's banks, including international bank branches, gold from Hong Kong, Thailand and Dubai is also smuggled through Nepal, under the control of Indian traffickers. UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 1946, (E/RES/1946/9(I)) UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, March 30, 1961 The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, (CND Res.6(XXVIII)) International co-operation in drug abuse control, December 17, 1979, The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, December 19, 1988, (A/RES/43/120) Measures to Enhance International Cooperation to Counter the World Drug Problem, April 17, 1988, (A/S-20/4) International Cooperation Against the World Drug Problem, December 17, 1999, Promoting international cooperation in responding to the challenges posed by new psychoactive substances, March 16, 2012, (CND_Resolution 55/1) Support for the National Drug Control Strategy of the Government of Afghanistan Technical assistance for implementing the international conventions and protocols related to counterterrorism (E/2011/30) Questions A Resolution Must Answer 1. What would be a proper definition of ‘narcoterrorsim'? 2. Should the activities of groups like FARC be considered merely criminal activities, or terrorist activities? 3. What measures can Member States take to stop VNSAs which also operate beyond their boundaries? 4. What are the factors which foster the growth of VNSAs and how can we combat 5. Is drug decriminalization a viable method of stopping the illegal drug trade? 6. How can the situation of the farmers who grow opium out of desperation be
ARTICLE IN PRESS Lung Cancer xxx (2009) xxx–xxx Contents lists available at Angiogenic markers in breath condensate identify non-small cell lung cancer C. Gessner , B. Rechner , S. Hammerschmidt , H. Kuhn , G. Hoheisel , U. Sack , P. Ruschpler , H. Wirtz a Department of Respiratory Medicine, University of Leipzig, Liebigstrasse 20, 04103 Leipzig, Germanyb Institutes of Clinical Immunology and Transfusion Medicine, University of Leipzig, Johannisallee 30, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
PROTOCOL FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ACETAMINOPHEN TO TREAT FEVER Acetaminophen is the generic name of the pharmaceutical product sold commercially under the brand names AtasolTM, TempraTM, TylenolTM and other private labels. Acetaminophen has analgesic (pain-reducing) and antipyretic (fever-preventing and fever-reducing) properties. It does not have anti-inflammatory properties. Although it is an over-the-counter medication,